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Over the past dozen years, provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code") and regulations barring exempt status (and eligibility to receive
tax-deductible contributions) to any religious, educational, or other charitable organization that participates in the electoral process have been invoked
to give a new and exceedingly sharp edge to the debate about the proper
role of religious leaders and institutions in the American political arena.
The Code conditions exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) and qualification for receipt of deductible contributions under Section 170(c)(2) on an
organization's refraining from any participation or intervention in any
political campaign for or against any candidate for public office.' The pertinent regulations forbid such activity whether it is direct or indirect and
declare that the prohibition extends at least to oral and written statements
supporting or denouncing a candidate.2
Highly vocal opposition to continued exemption of certain churches
that have openly involved themselves in electoral campaigns has come in
recent years both from special interest groups disagreeing with a specific
church's stance and from organizations that see a more general threat to the
nation in political activity by organized religion. 3 Yet Congress has been
conspicuously silent in the current controversy, and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS or "Service") has essentially dodged the issue. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, recently presented with an opportunity to open
the way for consideration of the constitutional legitimacy of the tax code's
* Attorney, New York, N.Y.; member, New York and Connecticut State Bars. B.S. 1970,
Syracuse University; J.D. 1991, Fordhan University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
guidance of Professor Charles M. Whelan, S.J., Fordham University School of Law, in the preparation of this Article.
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise
indicated.
2. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(i), (iii) (as amended in 1990).
3. See infra notes 11, 32, and accompanying text.
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prohibition as applied to churches, sidestepped the question on unconvincing procedural grounds.4
This inaction has perpetuated the morass of legal, definitional, political,
and other questions implicated by the bar to any electoral speech or activity
by Section 501(c)(3) entities. Absolute and seemingly straightforward on its
face, the provision has given rise to conflicting signals from Congress, a
pattern of inconsistent interpretation and haphazard enforcement by the
Service, and confusion and uncertainty among the organizations subject to
it.5 These problems take on a distinctive cast for churches, for whom providing spiritual leadership is an act not readily separable from comment on
and participation in the public debate about a host of issues that fall within
the political as well as the moral realms of the nation's life.
The restriction also raises constitutional questions in both the free
speech and free exercise areas that have not been determined by the
Supreme Court.6 Given the unsettled state of First Amendment jurisprudence in both contexts, however, the outcome of a Supreme Court review of
these issues is difficult to predict. But the judiciary is not, obviously, the
sole arena in which affected citizens and organizations may challenge a legislative mandate that is not only constitutionally suspect but also ill-considered, unjustifiable, and apparently incapable of clear definition or
evenhanded enforcement. The paramount cause served by the tax code's
absolute prohibition on electoral speech and activity by exempt charities
may well be that of incumbent elective officeholders.' Still, it is not inconceivable that Congress could be persuaded to modify the prohibition in a
way that protects the genuine public interests at stake without unnecessarily
trammeling the expressive freedom of churches and other charitable groups,
or subjecting them, as is now the case, to arbitrary threats to their continued existence. It is also possible that the Treasury itself would support an
effort by exempt organizations to seek equity and coherence in an area
4. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 918 (1990) (discussed infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text).
5. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 349-51 (6th ed. 1992);
infra Section II.
6. See infra notes 231-240 and accompanying text (recent Supreme Court decisions concerning the scope of the government's right to condition public benefits on abrogation of free speech
rights may render § 501(c)(3) political speech and activity prohibition unconstitutional); Ellis M.
West, The FreeExercise Clause and the InternalRevenue Code's Restrictionson the PoliticalActivity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 421 (1986) (vagueness of
Court's reasoning in past free exercise cases makes outcome of free exercise challenge to
§ 501(c)(3) political activity prohibition uncertain).
7. See infra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Terry L. Slye, Rendering unto Caesar:
Defining "Religion"forPurposes of Administering Religion-Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L.

& PUB. POL'Y 219, 291 (1983).
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where enforcement can only be the source of endless headaches and eroded
credibility,' offset by little or no revenue. 9
With such considerations in mind, this Article attempts to document
why and how the current statutory and regulatory formulation of the campaign activity prohibition has ultimately failed to work, either (depending
on one's point of view as to its congressional genesis) as an in terrorem
device to suppress unwelcome speech on electoral matters or as an instrument to effect sound public policy. It does so chiefly through the lens of
political activity by churches, because enforcement of the provision in the
context of religiously based speech and conduct highlights most clearly the
complexities and dilemmas inherent in the prohibition. Section I briefly
reports on church interventions in the electoral process over the past twelve
years, looking for the most part at the political speech and conduct of
churches of the New Christian Right at the outset of the Reagan era; of
black churches in the election campaigns of black candidates, especially the
Reverend Jesse Jackson's 1988 presidential bid; and of the Roman Catholic
Church with respect to campaigns in which the candidates' stands on abortion were, or became, a dominant feature.
The Article next discusses, in Section II, the development of the statutory provision and of the regulations and rulings governing its application,
and their interplay with other statutes and regulations concerning the political activities of exempt entities. Section II also examines the uncertain and
sometimes inconsistent interpretations given the campaign activity prohibition by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service, the uneven pattern of
Treasury enforcement (and nonenforcement), and attempts by others to enforce the prohibition through third-party lawsuits.
Section III critically analyzes the rationales that have been offered to
justify the absolute bar on campaign activity, concluding that there is no
defensible basis for singling out Section 501(c)(3) organizations, alone
among tax-exempt groups, for loss or denial of exempt status solely on the
grounds of political speech or activity. In addition, Section III proposes an
8. Seeking dismissal of a suit brought by third parties to force the Treasury to revoke the tax
exemption of the Roman Catholic Church on grounds of political activity, the United States Solicitor General acknowledged in arguments to the Supreme Court the difficulty that the IRS encounters in enforcing the campaign activity prohibition against churches in particular. Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.9, Baker v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, No. 86-157 (1986). The
Internal Revenue Commissioner has also complained to Congress about the public perception and
other problems of enforcing the proscription's vague standards. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. As commentators have pointed out, revocation of charitable status is far more likely to
result in a dead organization than in a taxable one. Laura B. Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A
Proposalfor Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 319 (1990).
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alternative limitation on electoral participation that is clear and enforceable
and that preserves the legitimate government interest in denying use of taxdeductible contributions for electoral speech by churches and other charitable entities without sacrificing constitutional values or good public policy.
I.

BACKGROUND: POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM IN THE EIGHTIES

In 1980, the issue of the federal tax code's prohibition against campaign
speech and activity by exempt churches rumbled just below the surface of
two major news stories that thrust the debate about the role of religion in
American political life to the forefront of public consciousness. One was
the emergence of the so-called "New Christian Right" as a potent political
force in the presidential and other campaigns of that fall. Identifying itself
with the evangelical churches and espousing a religiously motivated "profamily, pro-life, pro-morality" agenda, the movement concentrated its partisan efforts not only on winning the presidency for Ronald Reagan but also
on securing the defeat of numerous incumbent federal and state officeholders viewed as unsympathetic to its goals.1 ° The movement's rhetoric of
righteousness and burgeoning political successes was met by sharp criticism
from liberal groups and commentators and from mainline churches who
objected that the Christian Right was encouraging religious intolerance and
endangering religious liberty and church-state separation." Press reports
alleged that although the electoral battles of the Christian Right were being
led by political action committees and other groups whose status under the
federal tax laws permitted some carfipaign intervention, these organizations
were making open appeals for electoral activism to the evangelical
churches.12 Allegations also began to circulate that funds were being illegally passed from evangelical churches and religious organizations into the
movement's political coffers. 3
At the same time, the nation's attention was turned toward political
activism within the Roman Catholic Church. Controversy was sparked
when, just two days before Massachusetts's congressional primary elections,
Archbishop Humberto Cardinal Medieros of Boston issued a strongly
worded pastoral letter suggesting that Catholics who voted for candidates
10. Allan J. Mayer et al., A Tide of Born-Again Politics, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at 28
[hereinafter Born-Again Politics].
11. Kenneth A. Briggs, Dispute on Religion Raised by Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1980,
§ 1, at 31; Kenneth A. Briggs, The Influence of Church Leaders in Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1980, at A13; Anthony Lewis, PoliticalReligion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1980, at A27.
12. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Going to Court with the Strange Bedfellows of Politics,Religion, and
Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1980, at D12; Born-Again Politics,supra note 10.
13. Id.
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who had taken pro-choice positions would themselves be tainted with the
"deadly sin" of abortion. 4 Another storm of public criticism followed,15
including accusations that the Archbishop had attempted to use his position
of clerical authority "to intimidate a congregation into voting the church's
way." 6 Meanwhile, newspapers were also reporting on the overtly political
activity of some Catholic priests, particularly with respect to the abortion
issue,1 " and on a pamphlet published by the United States Catholic Conference calling on Catholics to evaluate political candidates in light of the
Church's stand on a range of issues, including abortion, arms control, capital punishment, and agricultural policies.1 8
As these stories were breaking in the national media, a group of prochoice organizations filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court
accusing various agencies of the Catholic Church of intervention in political
campaigns and seeking to force the Department of the Treasury to revoke
the Church's charitable status under the Internal Revenue Code.' 9 The legality of religious involvement in electoral politics under the tax laws thus
itself became part of the growing controversy, with commentators debating
the constitutional soundness of the Code's prohibition.2 0 The editor of an
archdiocesan newspaper in Texas responded with open defiance, publishing
an editorial that discussed the abortion stands of all the presidential candidates and concluded that Ronald Reagan alone was an acceptable candidate. The editorial ran under the headline "To The IRS - NUTS!!!"'2'
Contention over the relationship between religion and politics persisted
at the level of a dull roar during the next several years, taking the form of
disputes on such subjects as school prayer, "creation science" curricula, the
14. James N. Goodsell, Cardinal'sAbortion Letter Stirs PoliticalControversy, CHRISTIAN SCI.
Sept. 15, 1980, at 4 [hereinafter Cardinal'sAbortion Letter]; Michael Knight, Cardinal
Cautions Voters on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1980, at A20. While the letter stopped short
of naming any candidates, the message was widely understood to have been aimed principally at
two particular Democrats running for House seats. Id. Both candidates won their elections. See
George B. Merry, Liberals Top Bay State Primaries,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 1980, at
6.
15. Cardinal'sAbortion Letter, supra note 14; Editorial, Private Religion, Public Morality,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1980, at E18.
16. Editorial, The Archbishop and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1980, at A26.
17. Kenneth A. Briggs, Debate is Growing on Legalities of Religious Activism, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1980, at A22; Marjorie Hyer, Despite PapalDecree, PriestsSpeak Out on "Moral"Issues,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1980, at Cl.
18. Hyer, supra note 17.
19. See Briggs, supra note 17; see also infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
20. David M. Alpern, Churches, Politicsand the Tax Man, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1980, at 46;
Hyer, supra note 17; see Taylor, supra note 12.
21. See Alpern, supra note 20. The IRS apparently ignored the infraction. Kenneth L.
Woodward et al., The Churches v& the State, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1981, at 78.
MONITOR,
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tax exemption of racially discriminatory religious schools, continued religious activism on abortion and arms control, and President Reagan's diplomatic recognition of the Vatican and designation of 1983 as the "Year of
the Bible." 2 The dull roar erupted noisily during the 1984 campaign season. The press reported, for example, that President Reagan's national
campaign manager had sent letters to 45,000 Protestant ministers around
the country, identifying the Republican incumbents as "leaders under
God's authority" and urging the clerics to involve their ministries in the
upcoming campaign.2 3 Then, in a speech to some 17,000 evangelical ministers the day after the Republican convention, the President implicitly attacked as "intolerant" opponents of a proposed constitutional amendment
to allow prayer in public schools.2 4 Democratic candidate Walter Mondale
hit back swiftly, and the role of religion in political affairs became what one
observer called "the hottest issue" of the 1984 race. 5
As the election year progressed, some Catholic prelates formally cautioned their churches not to endorse candidates, take partisan positions, or
permit any candidate or party to use church facilities.2 6 At the same time,
however, a number of other bishops issued strong statements on abortion
that conveyed criticism of Catholic candidates, such as Democratic vice
presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro, who had adopted pro-choice positions. 27 And in a story that was overshadowed by other campaign news, it
was reported that the Reverend Jesse Jackson was calling on the nation's
black churches for financial support and volunteer workers for his presidential primary bid, giving campaign speeches from pulpits across the country
and raising funds by passing the collection plates.28 Challenges to the legality of such conduct were made in editorials published in periodicals affiliated with other religious groups, as the Reverend Jackson's campaign staff
disavowed knowledge that any ministers were actually urging their congregations to vote for the candidate.2 9

22. Ted Gest et al., When Church and State Collide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 5,
1984, at 42, 43.

23. James Reston, Reagan'sPoliticalReligion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1984, at A23; Charlotte
Saikowsky, Reagan Softens Rhetoric, Not Stance, on Matters Religious, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Sept. 7, 1984, at 3.
24. Kenneth M. Pierce, God and the Ballot Box, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 26.
25. Id.
26. Maljorie Hyer, PoliticalNeutrality Advised, WASH. POST, July 11, 1984, at B3.

27. Fox Butterfield, Archbishop of Boston Cites Abortion as "Critical"Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1984, at B13.

28. Richard N. Ostling, Jesse Takes Up the Collection, TIME, Feb. 6, 1984, at 57.
29. Id.
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With the waning of the Reagan presidency, the bitter disputes over religion in politics died down to a murmur.30 The issue briefly regained the
national spotlight, however, at the start of the 1988 primary races, when
Jesse Jackson announced a drive to raise campaign funds through Sunday
collections in about 500 black churches around the country on January
31.31 The plan drew immediate condemnation from two large public interest lobbying groups, People for the American Way and Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, which called on the candidate to drop
the idea.3 2 After the fund drive proceeded as planned,3 3 one of the groups,
Americans United, formally petitioned the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and take action against the churches that had participated as well
as against an exempt religious organization alleged to have channelled
funds to the Reverend Pat Robertson's Republican primary campaign and
evangelical churches reported to have participated actively in that campaign. 34 The controversy faded quickly, and Jackson's use of church altars
as political platforms and church congregations as sources of campaign

contributions continued throughout the spring and summer.3 ' Black ministers around the nation openly endorsed Jackson and used their churches as
bases for voter registration drives to get out the vote on behalf of Jackson
and black candidates in other races.36
30. Curtis J. Sitomer, How Will Religion Play at the Polls Come November?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1988, at 5.

31. Jackson to Pass the Plate at Churches Sunday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1988, at A23.
32. David Treadwell, Campaign 88: ChurchDrive Still On, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1988, § 1,at
24; David E. Anderson, Jackson Challengedon Fund Collection Bid, UPI, Jan. 21, 1988, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
33. The drive was reported to have raised anywhere from $85,000, LR.S. Is Urged to Investigate Jackson'sChurch Collections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1988, at B6 [hereinafter LR.S. Is Urged],
to more than $300,000, Passingthe Plate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 15, 1988, at 20.
34. David E. Anderson, IRS Asked to Scrutinize Churches in Politics, UPI, Feb. 12, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; see also LR.S. Is Urged,supra note 33. The IRS did
eventually act against at least one evangelical church that endorsed the Reverend Robertson's
candidacy. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
35. Marilyn Milloy, Campaign '88 Jesse Jackson: His Broadened Campaign Centers on a Call
for Economic Justice, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1988, at 4; Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Jackson Passes the
Plate - From Church to Mansion, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1988, § 1, at S10; Michael Tackett &
Mitchell Locin, Jackson Again Stumps from Pulpit, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1988, § 1, at 5; Robin
Toner, Hosannas to God and Votes for Jackson, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1988, at A16; Michael
Conlon, Jackson Marches on Atlanta, Vows to Press Campaign, Reuter Library Report, July 16,
1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
36. Laurent Belsie, Black Churches and US Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 2, 1988,
at 1; Margaret B. Carlson, More Than a Crusade,TIME, Mar. 7, 1988, at 16; Churches' Vote Drive
Set, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 1988, at 33; Merle English, Jackson Campaign Mobilizing Churches,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1988, at 27; Robin Toner, From Pool to Pool, Condo to Farm, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1988, at 36; Toner, supra note 35; Clergy Back Jackson, UPI, Apr. 16, 1988, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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Between the 1988 and 1992 Presidential elections, stories about campaign-related conduct by churches continued to appear in the media. In
1989 and 1990, for example, the Washington press reported the efforts of
African Methodist Episcopal Bishop H. Hartford Brookins, dubbed "the
Kingmaker" in recognition of his longtime influential role in black politics
nationally, to "broker" the District of Columbia mayoral race.3 7 Roman
Catholic Bishop Leo Maher of San Diego in 1989 publicly barred from the
sacrament of the Eucharist a Catholic candidate for the California Senate
just days before a special election in which the state legislature's voting balance on abortion rights was at stake.38 The past several years have also seen
continued reports of mayoral and other candidates on the stump in
churches, seeking votes, raising funds, and collecting clerical endorsements;3 9 of the periodic flaring of acrimony between New York's Catholic
hierarchy and politicians over the moral obligations of Catholic candidates
and officeholders in their public capacities;' and of campaign involvement
on behalf of conservative candidates by evangelical Christian churches. 4
During the 1991 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign of openly racist Republican candidate David Duke, scores of churches pledged to help get out the
vote on behalf of Duke's opponent,4 2 and numerous Catholic, Protestant,
37. Eric Pianin & Michael York, Kingmaker Chargesinto D.C. Seeking "Clarity" in "Chaos"
of Mayor's Race, WASH. POST, May 28, 1989, at Cl; Larry Witham, AME Bishop BringsHis High
Profile to District, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990, at B1.
38. Ad L. Goldman, Legislator Barredfrom Communion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, at
A18.
39. Sam Fullwood III, Wilder Shifts Campaign's Focus to Woo Black Voters, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1991, at Al; A. Dahleen Glanton & John Camper, Evans Camp Focuses on Fundraising,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1989, § 2, at 3; Ari. L. Goldman, ForDinkins, Black Churches Offer Hearts
and Pulpit, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1989, § 1, at 27; Chris Harvey, "Race Baiting" Irks Foe, but
Voters Pick Savage, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1990, at Al; Pam McClintock, D.C. Council Primary
Seen Offering Minimum Surprises, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1990, at B4; Michele L. Norris, P.G.
Black Coalition Backs Williamsfor New House Seat, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1992, at D 1; Michael
Powell, Dinkins in Home Stretch Stumping with the Air ofa Winner, NEWSDAY, Sept. 11, 1989, at
3; Black DemocratSeeks Governorship in S. CarolinaPrimary, REUTERS, June 11, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTER File.
40. Ari L. Goldman, O'ConnorDenies Plan to Excommunicate Anyone, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1990, § 4, at 5; Ari L. Goldman, O'Connor Warns PoliticiansRisk Excommunication over Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1990, at Al; Robin Toner, Catholic Politicians Confront Public and
Private Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1990, at Al.
41. David Ibata, "Impressions" Foes Fall in School Board Races, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 1991,
§ 2, at 10; Lynn Smith & Dave Lesher, Christian Activists Assume Large Role in O.C. Politics,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at Al.
42. Peter Applebome, On Eve of Louisiana Vote, Nothing Is Certain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1991, at Al.

1992]

POLITICAL EXPRESSION BY CHURCHES

and Jewish clergy were reported to have instructed their congregations to
avoid endorsing racist views when they cast their ballots.4 3
Shortly before the start of the 1992 presidential primary races, the Internal Revenue Service finally spoke out on church political activity, issuing an
oddly equivocal warning to the religious community. The occasion was a
public announcement that the Jimmy Swaggart Ministries' 1986 endorsements of Reverend Robertson's presidential candidacy had been found to
violate the electoral activity prohibition and that the church would be required as a consequence to take measures to ensure that the violations
would not recur. 4 Noting that the Treasury could have revoked the Ministries' tax exemption, an IRS official nonetheless added: "'But our goal is
Later in the spring, the Service pubnot to put folks out of business.'
lished an advisory reminding charitable organizations generally of the electoral proscription and of the penalties, including revocation of exempt
status, that could result from its breach. 46 If these cautions had a dampening effect on electoral activity by churches, it was not universal, for clerical
endorsements of, and the opening of church doors to, presidential candidates remained features of the political reports as the campaign
progressed. 4 7
"'5

43. Roberto Suro, Duke Recasts His Religious Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at A12.
44. Jimmy Swaggart Ministry Admits Tax Law Violation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at F17;
Shun Politics, Tax-Exempt Groups Told, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1992, at B5. As the cost of preserving its exemption, the church was required by the IRS to agree to a structural reorganization,
establish a "special compliance committee," promise to refrain from further electoral intervention,
and publicize its misdeed. Id.
45. Shun Politics, Tax-Exempt Groups Told, supra note 44, at B5. At an American Bar Association tax meeting several weeks later, that same official stated that the Service would be on the
alert for, and act against, breaches of the campaign activity proscription during the 1992 election
season, and that the Swaggart announcement was intended as a warning that such violations
would be treated seriously. IRS Official Warns Exempt Groups Not to Engage in PoliticalActivities, B.N.A. DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Feb. 19, 1992, at G-3 [hereinafter IRS Official
Warns]. Again the official pulled the punch, however, by adding that in any given case, the facts
and circumstances of the violation may militate against revocation. Id.; see also infra note 187
and accompanying text.
46. I.R.S. News Release IR-92-57 (May 4, 1992).
47. E.g., Chris Black & John Milne, Buchanan Says Nation Has 'Forgotten God'; Campaign
'92, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1992, at 6; Peggy Dye, 'Why I'm Taking a Risk on Ross Perot,'
NEWSDAY, July 16, 1992, at 101; Ian Fisher, Butts Backs an Educatorfor President,N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 1992, at B3; Ralph Z. Hallow, FalwellSays He'll Deliver Evangelical Vote, WASH. TIMES,
July 23, 1992, at Al; Gwen Ifill, Campaigningon Sundays Brings Out a Different Bill Clinton,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at A14; David Lauter & Sam Fulwood III, Clinton, Brown Trying to
Reach Out to Voters, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at Al; Robert Pear, Nation Needs Healing, Clinton Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1992, at B9; Quayle Affirms He Won't Quit Ticket, L.A. TIMES,
July 27, 1992, at A19; Jeffrey Schmalz, Brown, in New York Assails Clinton with a New Ferocity,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at Al; Gayle White, Quayle Touts Traditional Values to Baptists,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 9, 1992, at Al.
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There can be little doubt that most, if not all, of the activity by churches
and their leaders described above breached the tax code's prohibition on the
involvement of exempt churches in electoral matters, as that provision has
been defined and explicated by the Treasury and the courts.4 8 Yet the
churches and their leaders can respond to critics of their conduct with powerful moral, theological, and historical arguments to which the simplistic
formulations of the federal tax authorities supply no ready answers. For
example, to the Catholic bishops who embrace their church's teaching that
abortion is, literally, the murder of a human being created in God's image,
silence in the political debate about abortion rights would be a profound
betrayal of their pastoral obligations. The often extreme rhetoric of the
Christian right, and the tendency of some within it to mix spiritual with
distinctively secular concerns such as the security of Taiwan and balanced
federal budgets, do not vitiate the deeply religious convictions that have
inspired most of the activism of evangelical clergy and churches. And an
assault on the political role of black churches may be seen as nothing less
than an assault on black enfranchisement itself, which was nurtured within
the churches during a time when no other forum for the black political
voice existed. Many view that role as inseparably bound to the black vision
of Christianity. As writer Garry Wills has pointed out, the political involvement of black churches has deep roots running straight back to the
miliastic theology of the Christianized slaves.4 9
48. See infra Section II.
No Treasury regulations or rulings address the question of when the speech or conduct
of a cleric will be attributed to his or her church for purposes of assessing whether the
church is entitled to charitable status. The IRS General Counsel has taken the position
that the conduct of "officials" of a charitable entity who have actual or purported authority
to speak on its behalf is attributable to the entity itself, as are the acts of agents that are
either within the scope of their authority or are ratified by the entity. Gen. Couns. Mem.
34,631 (Oct. 4, 1971); see also Leif M. Clark, Note, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of
the Controls, 16 Hous. L. REv. 480, 500-01 (1979) (imputation of cleric's expressed views
to his or her church may depend on church's own policy regarding institutional status of
clergy as well as on Treasury interpretation of the principles of agency law.). The Counsel
has further stated that the activities of officials in excess of their authority are ratified, and
hence imputed, if the organization fails to challenge them. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,414
(Feb. 29, 1984); Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,523 (June 11, 1971).
The activities of "members" of an organization may also be attributed, according to the
Counsel, if the entity has "either directly or indirectly authorized or ratified" them. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,414 (Feb. 29, 1984). In applying this standard, the Counsel recommended a finding of ratification where a church's members engaged in electioneering in the
church's name and with the knowledge of church leaders, who made no effort to put a stop
to the activity. Id.
49. GARRY R. WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 195-206 (1990).
In addition, theologian Harvey Cox asserted in 1984 that "Jesse Jackson's campaign is simply not
comprehensible unless it is seen as the voice of the religious traditions and values arising from the
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In the face of this conundrum, the Internal Revenue Service has in recent years elected what was perhaps the only course realistically open to it
with respect to churches: It fought the attempts of pro-choice groups to
force it to move against the tax exemption of the Roman Catholic
Church,50 made a mild example of one offending church, and otherwise
stood silently by. But if this administrative policy has spared the Treasury
a bitter and perhaps unwinnable political, religious, and even racial confrontation with the churches, it has not solved the inherent problems posed
by the ill-defined electoral prohibition itself. The prohibition continues to
be enforced against more conveniently situated transgressors and hangs as a
constant amorphous threat to religiously inspired speech in the political
arena.
II.

THE SCOPE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION ON
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

A.

The Framework of Tax Provisions Governing ElectoralSpeech and
Activities by Tax-Exempt Organizations

1. The Section 501(c)(3) Prohibition
Churches and religious organizations, along with a variety of other
charitable entities, are exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code provided that they meet the requirements of
51
Section 501(c)(3), commonly known as the "charitable exemption.
Groups claiming this exemption are subject to restrictions on their activities, including an unqualified prohibition on "participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."'5 2 Treasury regulations give some guidance on the contours of
black church, especially the concern for the poor and marginal of our society, which is a very
biblical message." Voices of Reason, Voices of Faith, TIME, Sept. 27, 1984, at 28.
50. See infra note 203.
51. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) sweeps in groups "organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary .... educational" and other
enumerated purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
52. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Identical language restricts most, although not all, groups qualified to
receive tax-deductible contributions, bequests, and gifts. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 2055(a)(2),
2106(a)(2)(ii), 2522(a)(2), 2522(b)(2); infra note 221.
Charities are also subject to a companion prohibition against carrying on "substantial" propaganda and lobbying activity. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(1D), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(ii),
2522(a)(2), 2522(b)(2). The validity of the prohibition has been upheld by the Supreme Court

against a constitutional challenge. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text. Because it
raises issues different from the electioneering prohibition, the lobbying restriction is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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the prohibition, declaring, for example, that forbidden activities "include,
but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of written or printed
statements or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to
...a candidate"; barring such activities whether they are engaged in "directly or indirectly"; and defining a "candidate for public office" as "an
individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others.., for an elective
office" at the local, state, or national level.5 3
Among all the numerous classes of entities exempted from taxation by
the Code,5 4 charities alone are absolutely subject to loss of exempt status for
any amount of political campaign activity.5 5 Charitable organizations are
also among the very few classes of entities accorded the tax benefit of eligi6
bility to receive deductible contributions, gifts, and bequests.1
The limitation on campaign speech and activity of charities was enacted
in 1954"7 after being introduced as a floor amendment by Senator Lyndon
B. Johnson, who apparently believed that a Texas private foundation was
indirectly contributing to the campaign of an opponent in a primary election. For over three decades, Congress shed no light on the scope of or
rationale for the provision, beyond a passing mention in 1969 that Section
501(c)(3) permits "no degree of support for an individual's candidacy for
public office." 5 9 A small amount of clarification (but also some obfuscation) of the rule was offered several years ago when Congress amended the
Code as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA).
The amendments grew out of hearings by the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, which was spurred to action not, evidently, by the
activities of churches but by the widely publicized lobbying and campaign
efforts of certain secular advocacy groups 60 and the use by some politicians
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(e)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
54. I.R.C. § 501(c) describes 24 classes of entities, in addition to charities, which are exempt
from federal income taxation. Exemption is also offered through §§ 521 (farmers' cooperatives),
526 (ship owners' protection and indemnity associations), 527 (political organizations), and 528
(homeowners' associations).
55. The IRS has, however, placed limits on the campaign activity of groups qualifying for
exemption as social welfare organizations under Code § 501(c)(4). See infra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.

56. See supra note 50.
57. Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 501(c)(3), 68A Stat. 1, 163 (1954).
58. HoPKINS, supra note 5, at 327; Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, IR.C.
§ 501(c)(3): Practicaland ConstitutionalImplications of "Political"Activity Restrictions, 2 J. L. &
POL'Y 169, 186 (1985).

59. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1969); S.REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
47 (1969).
60. PAUL E. TREUSCH, TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 308-09 (3d ed. 1988);

Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt OrganizationAdvocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND.
L.J. 201, 203-04 (1988); A. Mark Christopher, PoliticalActivities Become More Risky for Tax-
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of Section 501(c)(3) organizations to showcase their stands on issues in advance of their formal declarations of candidacy in upcoming presidential
elections.61 In its report on the proposed amendments, the House for the
first time gave a legislative rationale for the campaign restriction, stating
that the "prohibition on political campaign activities ... by charities reflects [a] Congressional polic[y] that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in

political

affairs."62

The House OBRA Report explicitly affirmed that the bar on campaign
intervention by churches is absolute and that any amount of such conduct
renders an organization wholly ineligible for exemption from federal income taxes and receipt of tax-deductible contributions.6 3 At the same time,
however, the Report also called for two tiers of excise tax penalties on the
electoral activities of charitable organizations in a way that seems to con-

template instances in which exemption would not necessarily be revoked for
such activity." These intermediate penalties, incorporated into the Code in

new Section 4955, apply to "political expenditures," defined in relevant part
as "any amount paid or incurred by a Section 501(c)(3) organization in any
participation in, or intervention in... any political campaign."6 The firsttier tax is to be levied on the political expenditures of the offending charity
and, in some cases, on its managers individually.6 6 In the second-tier, a
much harsher penalty is reserved for those organizations and managers who
fail to "correct" the activity67 by recovering the expenditures to the extent
possible and instituting safeguards to ensure that the violation does not reExempts Due to RA '87, 68 J. TAX'N 136, 136 (March 1988). Congressional attention focused in
particular on an organization called the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty,
which had allegedly channeled profits from arms sales to Iran into lobbying in favor of United
States aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua and into campaigns against congressional incumbents
who opposed such aid. IdL The group had the poor judgment to campaign against Congressman
J.J. Pickle, chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, who promptly called the hearings to address
the problem of lobbying and electioneering by exempt charities. Chisolm, supra, at 203 & n.16.
The Endowment's exempt status was revoked by the Internal Revenue Service after the group's
president admitted that deductible contributions had been used to support the Contras and
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government. The PoliticalActivities of Exempt Groups
What the Experts Say, 34 TAX NoTEs 1147-49 (1987).
61. See Laura B. Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax
Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizationsby Politicians, 51 U.
PrTT. L. Rv. 577, 579-85 (1990).
62. H.R. REP. No. 391 (II), Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, at 1625 (1987).
63. Id. at 1624, 1627. The absolute nature of prohibition had previously been asserted by
courts and, occasionally, by the Service. See infra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 391 (II), supra note 62, at 1623-24.
65. I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1).
66. See I.R.C. § 4955(a).
67. See I.R.C. § 4955(b).
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A conclusion that these provisions anticipate that some groups may
continue an exempt existence after engaging in the forbidden activities is
supported by the House OBRA Report's observation that the penalties
were justified in part because "the Internal Revenue Service may hesitate to
revoke the exempt status of a charitable organization for engaging in political campaign activities in circumstances where that penalty may seem disproportionate., 69 As will be seen, an identical ambivalence about the
absolute nature of the prohibition has also infected the Service's interpretation and enforcement of the provision for decades." Significantly, the
Treasury itself petitioned the Subcommittee, albeit unsuccessfully, to substitute the excise taxes for the mandatory revocation requirement.71
The Code amendments enacted as part of the 1987 Act also included a
number of other provisions aimed at controlling the electoral activities of
charities and, ostensibly, at clarifying the scope of the bar to such conduct.
For example, the parenthetical phrase "(or in opposition to)" was added by
Congress to the language of Section 501(c)(3) to make clear that the mandate against electioneering extends beyond speech and conduct in favor of a
given candidate for public office. 72 Additional enforcement authority was
conferred on the Service through new sections that permit it to curb "flagrant violations" by making immediate determinations and assessments of
income tax on the political expenditures of charities 73 and seeking injunction of such expenditures.7 4 The Code section that prevents a charity from
converting to Section 501(c)(4) exempt status 75 after losing its 501(c)(3) status because of excessive lobbying was expanded to prevent the conversion
after loss of 501(c)(3) status owing to campaign activities as well.76 The
latter change does not, however, apply to churches (which have never been
cur. 68

68. See I.R.C. § 4955(0(3).
69. H.R. REP. No. 391 (II), supra note 62, at 1623.
70. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
71. Christopher, supra note 60, at 138-39; see also TREUSCH, supra note 60, at 309 (IRS
informed Subcommittee that statute's vague standards made enforcement difficult and left IRS

itself vulnerable to accusations that enforcement was politically motivated).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 391 (II), supra note 62, at 1621; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess., at 1018 (1987). The addition is of dubious utility in resolving the definitional
problems associated with the prohibition, however. This phrase had long been part of the governing Treasury regulations. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Furthermore, application
of the campaign bar to "opposition" as well as "support" of candidates has not been a consequent-

ial question in the enforcement of § 501(c)(3)'s requirements. See infra Section II.B.
73. See I.R.C. § 6852.
74. See I.R.C. § 7409.
75. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) primarily exempts nonprofit organizations "operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare." See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
76. See I.R.C. § 504(a)(2).
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subject to the bar on such conversions)," nor do the remainder of the
OBRA amendments, which pertain to increased disclosure of certain kinds
of information by a variety of exempt groups.78
2.

Section 527 Political Organizations and Funds

Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the taxation (or, perhaps more properly the tax exemption) 79 of the political organization, defined as a "party, committee, association, fund, or other organization"
operated primarily to accept contributions or make expenditures for an "exempt function."8 0 An exempt function, in turn, is a successful or unsuccessful attempt to "influence the selection, nomination, election, or
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or
office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors."8 " Political organizations are subject to corporate income
tax rates, but only on their "taxable income,"8s2 which excludes both direct
expenses and "exempt function income." "Exempt function income" is income dedicated to exempt functions that comes in through contributions,
membership dues, fees or assessments, fundraising events, entertainment
events, sale of campaign materials, or "any bingo game."83
Explicit provision is made in Section 527 for electoral speech and conduct by organizations exempt from income tax under Section 501(c).84 The
relevant subsection first imposes the highest corporate tax rate on an exempt group's direct and indirect electoral expenditures (or on its total investment income if that is less than the electoral expenditures).85 The
statute then goes on to permit the exempt organization to avoid this tax if it

77. See I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(5), 504(c).
78. See Christopher, supra note 60, at 136-37. For example, the new rules requiring that
annual information returns filed by charities contain additional categories of information and be
made available for public inspection do not apply to churches and certain other religious organizations because they are not required to file such returns. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C); see also
I.R.S. Notice 88-120, 1988-48 I.R.B. 10 (Nov. 16, 1988) (providing guidance on OBRA disclosure
requirements).
79. I.R.C. § 527(a).
80. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
81. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
82. I.R.C. § 527(b).
83. I.R.C. § 527(c)(1), (c)(3). Investment income and the proceeds from the sale of campaign
materials, however, are not considered exempt function income if they are received in "the ordinary course of any trade or business." I.R.C. § 527(c)(3)(C), (f)(1).
84. I.R.C. § 527(0.
85. I.R.C. § 527(0(1), (0(2).
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makes the expenditure through a "separate segregated fund";8 6 such a fund
established by a Section 501(c) group is treated for tax purposes as a distinct political organization in its own right.8 7
As Section 527's regulations make clear, however, a church or other
charitable organization cannot escape Section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on
campaign intervention through the use of a separate segregated fund. 8 The
regulations state that the tax benefits of such a fund are unavailable to support activities "inconsistent with [an organization's] exempt status" and
single out in this regard groups described in Section 501(c)(3).19 Therefore,
campaign activities engaged in by a charity through a separate fund will be
imputed to the organization itself, and the effect will be the same as if the
organization had conducted the activity directly.90 That is, the organization will be subject to the tax on the activity imposed by Section 527(b)9 1 as
well as, presumably, the excise tax penalties mandated by Section 4955 and
92
loss of its exempt status.
It should be noted that the "exempt functions" described in Section 527
include attempts to influence the appointment, as well as the election, of
public officials.93 This distinction was considered by the Internal Revenue
Service in 1988, apparently in connection with the participation of charitable organizations in the public debate concerning President Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court.9 4 The IRS Counsel's
office concluded that a charity could, without jeopardy to its tax status, seek
86. I.R.C. § 527(0(3). The concept of the separate segregated fund, which embraces the

political action committee, or PAC, is drawn from federal election law, although "separate segregated fund" is not specifically defined either there or in the tax code or regulations. HOPKINS,

supra note 5, at 664. The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. ch. 14 (1971, as amended),
prohibits certain entities from making specific types of "contributions" and "expenditures" in
connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1971, as amended). But corporations and
membership organizations such as labor unions may create separate segregated funds to solicit
voluntary contributions and engage in political campaign activity. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), b(b)(2)(C)
(1971, as amended). Such funds are subject to extensive and detailed public reporting requirements. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434 (1971, as amended).
87. I.R.C. § 527(0(3). According to the Internal Revenue Service, "[t]he practical result of
section 527(f)(3) is that a section 501(c) organization can segregate certain contributions for use in
an 'exempt function' and, as a result, only the investment income of the separate fund is subject to
tax." I.R.S. Ann. 88-114, 1988-37 I.R.B. 26 (Aug. 30, 1988).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(0, (g).
89. Id.
90. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988).
91. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1).
92. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
93. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
94. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988). While the Memorandum itself treated only in
general terms "the Senate confirmation of an individual nominated by the President to serve as a
Federal judge," the timing suggests that the individual in question was Judge Bork.
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to influence a Senate confirmation vote on a judicial nominee because such
activity did not constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign and hence was not inconsistent with Section 501(c)(3) classification.9"
It cautioned, however, that an exempt organization which engaged in such
conduct directly, without using a separate segregated fund, was subject to
the Section 527 tax on its expenditures in support of the effort. 96 The Counsel further observed that the activities in question fell within "a very small
range" of Section 527 political activities in which charities may engage at
97
all.
3.

The Section 501(c)(4) Affiliate

Nonprofit organizations devoted "exclusively [to] the promotion of public welfare" are exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(a) of the
Code through the operation of Section 501(c)(4). The pertinent regulations
state that social welfare organizations must involve themselves primarily
"in promoting in some way the common good and welfare of the community... for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social improvements." 9 8 These requirements, together with others imposed by the
Service (such as a prohibition on private inurement),9 9 render Section
501(c)(4) organizations virtually identical to charities in many respects. 1°0
Nonetheless, there are two major distinctions between social welfare
and charitable groups. First, charities may receive tax-deductible contributions, while social welfare organizations may not.101 Second, social welfare
groups, unlike charities, may exhibit some or all of the characteristics of
what the Treasury regulations term an "action organization.""0 2 Action
organizations are those that engage in substantial attempts to influence legislation, that espouse and advocate for a primary objective that may be attained only by legislative means, or that participate or intervene in political
campaigns for or against candidates for public office. 103 Specifically, the
Service has ruled that "an organization may carry on lawful political [cam-

95. Id.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1986).
99. Rev. Rul. 69-385, 1969-2 C.B. 123.
100. HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 564.
101. E.g., I.R.C. § 170(c) (Social welfare organizations are not among the groups the statute
makes eligible for receipt of deductible contributions.).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(i)-(iv) (as amended in 1990).
103. Id
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paign] activities and remain exempt under Section 501(c)(4) as long as it is
primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare."°
The ability of a Section 501(c)(4) group to engage in substantial attempts to influence legislation without peril to its exempt status has inspired
some charities over the years to split off Section 501(c)(4) affiliates to pursue
their lobbying aims, with affiliates supported by nondeductible contributions. 10 5 The Service initially viewed such arrangements with hostility,
threatening to impute the affiliate's activities to the associated charity where
the charity controlled the affiliate's positions or where the two groups
shared policy aims or facilities, management, and personnel." 6 In 1983,
however, a unanimous Supreme Court approved the use of these dual structures in Regan v. Taxation with Representation.0 7 In Regan, an organization that had originally split its substantial lobbying function off from its
charitable functions through an affiliation arrangement sought to bring the
lobbying function back under its Section 501(c)(3) umbrella.'
The group
alleged that the Code's limitation on the legislative activities of charities
was unconstitutional, in part because it violated free speech guarantees.' 9
In the course of turning back the First Amendment challenge, the Court
noted that the organization had the option of retaining the dual structure" 0
and asserted that there was no limitations on the use of such a structure
beyond separate incorporation and "records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying."'
Unanswered to date is the question of whether a charity may properly
use a sister Section 501(c)(4) organization to engage in campaign speech or
104. Rev. Rul. 91-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. The activities of the organization in question were
provisions of financial support and in-kind services to a political campaign. Id. The Code itself
does not address whether social welfare groups may engage in electoral activities. See I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4). The regulations declare that "promotion of social welfare does not include direct or
indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns.
...Treas. Reg. § 1.501(C)(4)l(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). But, as Revenue Ruling 91-95, supra, indicates, the Service has
decided that that language "doles] not impose a complete ban" on campaign involvement.
105. E.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (describing such
an affiliation arrangement). Exempt charitable organizations are forbidden to engage in "substantial" efforts to influence legislation. See supra note 52. Most such organizations can elect to have
their lobbying efforts assessed under either the Service's case-by-case interpretation of "substantial" or under specified expenditure limits. I.R.C. § 501(h). Churches and their "integrated auxiliaries" are among the groups not eligible to elect under § 501(h). I.R.C. § 501(h)(5).
106. Thomas A. Troyer & Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Supreme Court's TWR Decision Provides

Guidance in 501(c)(3) Lobbying, 59 J. TAX'N 66, 68 & nn.8-10 (1983).
107. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).

108. Id. at 542-43.
109. Id. at 542.
110. Id.

111. Id. at 545 n.6.
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activity on its behalf. After Regan, such an arrangement may be permissible, provided that the affiliate is separately incorporated and is not supported by tax-deductible contributions, 11 2 engages primarily in social
welfare rather than political campaign activity,I13 and observes the requirements of Section 527 with respect to political activity. 4 Thus, a church
that opposes abortion, for example, may be able to organize a social welfare
affiliate that primarily engages in attempts to initiate or change legislation
115
affecting abortion rights (a valid social welfare purpose under IRS rules)
but also devotes some of its time, money, and effort to the support or opposition of candidates for public office. It appears that under Regan's pronouncement concerning the minimal restrictions on interrelations between
a charity and its Section 501(c)(4) affiliate,1 16 the clergy of that church
should be able to comment from the pulpit on issues relevant to a current
election campaign or speak out for or against candidates as long as their
compensation for the time spent preparing and delivering such statements
and any other associated expenses are paid from the affiliate's income,
through a Section 527 segregated fund, rather than through the church's
income.
Of course, even if the Service were to permit it, this would not be a
viable option for the vast majority of churches and other charitable groups,
which may have no reason or desire to create a Section 501(c)(4) lobbying
affiliate or no prospect of raising sufficient nondeductible funds to support a
separate organization. It is possible, moreover, that the Treasury would
attack the dual structure under the circumstances described and move to
impute the campaign activity to the charity. The Service could argue that
because Congress already permits charities to engage in limited lobbying,
charities may consistently affiliate with groups that engage in a great deal of
lobbying, while an arrangement that allows Section 501(c)(3) organizations
to speak and act in the campaign sphere can be seen as inimical to Congress's intent in enacting the absolute prohibition on charities' electoral
conduct. ' 17 But to sustain such an attack, the Service would be required to
articulate the intent of Congress in a way that coherently explains why
charities should be permitted to engage in some lobbying but no campaign
112. Id.
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; cf Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194 (denying exemption under § 501(c)(4) to an organization whose primary activity was nonpartisan ratings of candidates for public office).
114. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
115. See Rev. Rul. 76-81, 1976-1 C.B. 176.
116. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also Troyer & Lauber, supra note 106, at
67 (The [Regan] Court in essence held that the affiliate can function as the charity's 'alter ego.' ").
117. Chisolm, supra note 9, at 331 & n.109.
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activity. As discussed below, neither the Service nor even Congress itself
1 18
has yet been able to do this.
B. Interpretationand Enforcement of Section 501(c)(3)s Prohibition on
Campaign Activity
1. Judicial Interpretations of the Prohibition
The interpretation and application of Section 501(c)(3)'s prohibition on
campaign speech and activity has never been reviewed by the Supreme
Court and has only infrequently been considered by other courts.1 19 Nonetheless, courts have ruled on several major questions raised by the statute.
The most far-reaching decision is that of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States.l"' In
this case, the IRS had revoked the tax-exempt status of a politically conservative religious organization in part because the group had, through its
religious broadcasts and publications, attacked liberal politicians and urged
its followers to support conservative ones. 121
In sustaining the revocation, the ChristianEchoes court ruled, first, that
the prohibition was constitutionally valid, both generally and as applied to a
religious organization. 122 Such minimal restrictions on either free exercise
of religious belief or free speech and assembly rights as the prohibition
might impose, the court stated, were justified by the government's interests
in keeping church and state separate 12 3 and in preserving the neutrality of
the Treasury Department with respect to political affairs. 124 Second, the
court found that Section 501(c)(3)'s bar to campaign activity had been violated by Christian Echoes even though the group "did not formally endorse
specific candidates for office."' 125 Third, the court did not distinguish between the organization's statements with respect to incumbent political
leaders and those with respect to candidates in an election period, implying
that the prohibition extends to both as long as a group's overall objective is
"to change the composition of the . . . government." 1 26 Finally, despite
118. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
119. HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 329.
120. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).

121. Id. at 856.
122. Id. at 856-57.
123. Id. at 857. Indeed, the court characterized the government's interest in church-state
separation in this context to be "overwhelming and compelling." Id.

124. Id. at 854, 857.
125. Id. at 856.
126. Id. This reading of the campaign activity prohibition has been challenged by at least one

commentator.

HOPKINS,

supra note 5, at 349.
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apparently strong evidence that Christian Echoes had been singled out for
revocation because of the substance of its political views, the court ruled
that the group had shown no injury to its due process rights.127
Sixteen years after Christian Echoes was decided, the Second Circuit
was called upon to determine the scope of the electioneering prohibition in
Association of the Bar v. Commissioner.128 Here, a local bar association already exempt from federal income tax under Section 501(c)(6) applied for
recognition as a charitable organization.12 9 The Service denied the application on the ground that the association's practice of rating candidates for
elective state and local judgeships, and then publicizing the ratings to voters, ran afoul of Section 501(c)(3)'s electioneering prohibition. 3 The Tax
Court, by a ten-to-six majority, overturned the IRS's decision and held that
the rating activity constituted "passive," nonpartisan voter education
that
1 31
did not rise to the level of prohibited campaign intervention.
Reversing the Tax Court, the Second Circuit ruled that activity on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate does not escape the prohibition
merely because it is carried on without reference to political parties. 132 The
court also found that ratings which characterize candidates for office as
"approved," "not approved," or "highly qualified" could not be regarded as
statements of objective fact and that publication of such ratings therefore
amounts to participation in the affected judges' campaigns for office. 133 The
court rejected, moreover, the association's contention that the ratings
passed muster under Section 501(c)(3) because they made up only an insubstantial part of the group's overall activities; Congress, declared the court,
wrote and intended the prohibition to be absolute.1 34 Finally, the Second
Circuit reiterated that the justification for the prohibition is preservation of
1 35
the U.S. Treasury's political neutrality.
Shortly after deciding Association of the Bar, the Second Circuit ruled
on a third-party challenge to the charitable exemption of a prominent voter
127. ChristianEchoes, 470 F.2d at 853, 857-58; see also infra note 190 and accompanying text
(discussing burden of proof of party alleging discriminatory enforcement of tax laws).
128. 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
129. Id. at 877. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) recognizes the exempt status of nonprofit business leagues
and similar organizations, which are not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. I.R.C.

§ 170(c).
130. Association of the Bar, 858 F.2d at 877-78.

131.
(2d Cir.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 599, 609-11 (1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 876
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
Association of the Bar, 858 F.2d at 880.
Id. at 880-81.
Id at 881.
Id at 879.
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education group by a minor party presidential candidate who claimed that
the group had breached the electoral activity prohibition when it denied her
an invitation to participate in nationally televised primary campaign debates. 1 36 In an opinion containing language difficult to reconcile with its
Association of the Bar holding, the court in Fulani v. League of Women
Voters Education Fund declared that the Fund's conduct in limiting the
debates to Republicans and Democrats did not violate the Section 501(c)(3)
proscription because the conduct involved primary election campaigns,
which, being exclusively intra-party matters, were inherently nonpartisan. 137 Whether the court intended this ruling to signal that campaign
speech and activity by charities is permissible as long as it takes place
outside the context of inter-party general elections or meant only to preserve the prerogative of charitable voter education groups to confine their
primary election candidate forums to candidates actually running in prima1 38
res remains unclear.
In 1981, a coalition of groups and individuals supporting the right of
women to obtain legal abortions sued the Treasury and two national organizations of the Roman Catholic Church in an attempt to force revocation of
the entire Church's Section 501(c)(3) tax exemption. 139 The suit was premised on alleged violations by various units of the Church of the statutory
proscription against electoral speech and activity, including endorsements
and other support of pro-life candidates for political office." 4° After more
than eight years of legal disputes among the parties about procedural issues, '' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the suit on
the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing,' 4 2 and the Supreme Court
136. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992).
137. Id. at 630.
138. The decision contains apparently contradictory statements. In announcing its holding,
the court stated that "the League's limiting of the debates to Republican and Democratic Party

candidates was not 'partisan,' and thus was not in contravention of I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3)." Fulani,
882 F.2d at 630. Yet the court also asserted that "the prohibition against partisan activity in
section 501(c)(3) bars more than the partisan promotion of certain candidates over other candidates," and that "an organization's selective promotion of certain parties over others would be

inconsistent with its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status." Id. at 629.
139. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
140. Id. at 1022.
141. Id. at 1023.
142. Id. at 1031.
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denied certiorari.' 4 3 None of the courts involved in the case ever reached
the merits of the suit."4
2.

Internal Revenue Service Interpretations of the Campaign Activity
Prohibition

While, as indicated above, the courts have provided some guidance on
the scope of Section 501(c)(3)'s bar to electoral speech and conduct by charitable organizations, the task of interpreting and enforcing the provision has
fallen mainly to the Internal Revenue Service. The Service's rulings and
General Counsel Memoranda' (as well as its enforcement patterns, to the
extent they can be discerned) convey more sharply than do the court cases
the complex conceptual problems and policy dilemmas latent in the prohibition. An examination of these rulings and statements highlights the vague
and inconsistent standards that have resulted from the Service's attempts to
reconcile the statutory language with the pragmatic realities of churches'
and other charitable organizations' behavior in pursuit of their exempt
purposes.
a. The Shifting Nature of the Prohibition
That an organization exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(3) may engage in no amount of speech or activity with respect to
any campaign by a candidate for public office without forfeiting or being
denied exempt status is a principle that recurs throughout judicial and congressional pronouncements on the subject of the electoral activity prohibi-

143. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918

(1990).
144. United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1023.
145. General Counsel Memoranda, which are prepared by attorneys in the Interpretive Division of the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Chief Counsel, "contain the reasons behind the
adoption of revenue rulings, private letter rulings, and technical advice memoranda" and "have
important precedential value" in the Service's determinations of future tax questions. Taxation
with Representation Fund v. IRS, 485 F. Supp. 263, 265-66 (D.D.C. 1980). The advice these
Memoranda contain, though generally followed by the Assistant Commissioner (Technical), is not
actually binding on him, however. See Tommy F. Thompson, The Unadministrabilityof the Federal Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6 n.20 (1985).
Moreover, the Service can, at any time, change the position it took in a General Counsel Memorandum and apply the new position retroactively. Id. at 7 n.23. While the positions taken in these
Memoranda are therefore not to be relied on by taxpayers as precedent, the Memoranda are nonetheless "an invaluable aid in analyzing and understanding the development of the Service's position on charitable exemption issues." Id. at 7; see also Taxation with RepresentationFund,485 F.
Supp. at 266 (General Counsel Memoranda are records "of vital concern to the public.")
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tion.146 The Treasury also has taken this position in regulations,' 7 in
General Counsel and other memoranda,14 8 in the Exempt Organization
Handbook,1 49 and before at least one court." 0 Yet it is a position that the
Service has occasionally abandoned in favor of a rule permitting a "de
minimis" amount of otherwise prohibited electoral activity by charities. In
1969 and 1970, for example, the Service grappled with the question whether
to revoke the exempt status of a religious organization that had published in
its magazine during the 1960 presidential campaign a series of articles attacking the candidacy of John F. Kennedy because of his Catholicism.1 '
The magazine had run not only original material on this theme but also
reports of similar articles and statements issued by other Protestant
churches and organizations. 5 2 Arguing against revocation, the IRS General Counsel declared that "political intervention inspired by deeply-held
religious convictions furnishes a prime example of a situation calling for
application of the de minimis rule.1 53 But the enforcement (and, perhaps,
political) problems posed by the Service's knowledge that a number of
churches had engaged in the same conduct as the subject organization were
equally on the Counsel's mind:
Are the exemptions of all these organizations to be revoked? If not,
do we have a rationale to explain what to some may seem an arbitrary application of the political proscription in section 501(c)(3)?
We think the de minimis principle may furnish the rationale demanded for an equal administration of the law.' 54
In a later memorandum concerning the same case, the Counsel acknowledged that "the Service has long accorded an exclusively educational
or religious status to a fairly large number of organizations that could like146. See Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989); United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982) (dictum); supra note 60 and accompanying text.
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)(3)(ii)-(iii) (as amended in 1990).
148. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,811 (June 30, 1989); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Sept. 27, 1985);
Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36002 (Sept. 8, 1989).
149. IRS Exempt Organization Handbook (IRM 7751) §§ 3(10) 1, 3(10) 5.
150. Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 599, 606 n.8 (1987), rev'd, 858 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
151. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,071 (Mar. 11, 1969).
152. Id.
153. Id. It is notable that the Service did not cite the de minimis standard in declining to
revoke the charitable exemption of the Jimmy Swaggart Ministries after finding that the church
had violated the electoral activity prohibition by making campaign endorsements from the pulpit
and in a church publication. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Service
gave no comprehensible legal or policy justification at all for its leniency in the Swaggart case. Id.;
see also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
154. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,071 (Mar. 11, 1969).
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wise be charged with having engaged in something more than an insignifi'
Yet elsewhere the
cant amount of political activity from time to time."155
applies
only to activity
de
minimis
standard
Counsel has asserted that the
that is "something less than an 'insubstantial' amount" and is of a "trifling
nature."

15 6

Despite the absoluteness of the statutory language proscribing campaign
speech and activity by exempt charities, there is ample justification for application of an equitable de minimis standard. For example, the Code's
requirement that Section 501(c)(3) entities be organized and operated "exclusively" for charitable purposes has long been interpreted to mean that
such groups need only have primarily charitable purposes. 1 57 As one court
stated in this context, "A slight and comparatively unimportant deviation
from the narrow furrow of tax approved activity is not fatal."' 58 Moreover,
as noted earlier, Congress itself may have recently authorized the Service to
decide in some cases that a charity's campaign activity will not lead to revocation of its tax-exempt status.' 59
A two-fold problem remains, however. First, all of the bodies charged
with oversight of the political speech and activity prohibition - the Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department - have either insisted that
the prohibition is absolute or have veered between insisting it is absolute
and conceding, tacitly or explicitly, that it is not. Second, the Service's wide
discretion and vague and inconsistent definitions of the de minimis standard
do not give charities fair notice of what level of campaign activity is permitted, by which groups, and under what circumstances.
b. DefinitionalProblems in IRS Enforcement
In its rulings and in the internal positions it has taken with respect to
Section 501(c)(3)'s campaign prohibition, the Service has repeatedly insisted that each individual case must be judged based on "all the facts and

155. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,267 (Feb. 20, 1970).
156. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,414 (Feb. 29, 1984); Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,682 (Nov. 9, 1967); see
also HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 328 & n.12 (Testifying before a congressional subcommittee in
1987, the Internal Revenue Commissioner stated that while the political activity prohibition is

absolute, "some consideration may be given to whether, qualitatively or quantitatively, the organization is in the circumstance where the activity is so trivial it is without legal significance and,
therefore, de minimus [sic].").
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(1) (as amended in 1990); HoPKINS, supra note 5, at 249.
158. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1967).
159. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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circumstances."'" A review of cases it has considered suggests that on key
questions this phrase often operates as little more than a reservation of very
broad discretion exercised without clear definitions or intelligible principles.
The Service has not, for example, developed a uniform position on
whether there can be prohibited campaign speech or activity outside the
context of a campaign. As noted earlier, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Christian Echoes interpreted Section 501(c)(3) to forbid attacks on
or endorsements of sitting incumbents whether or not they are actually candidates.16 1 The IRS General Counsel nonetheless stated in 1976 that in
order for conduct by a charity to be "intervention" or "participation" in a
campaign, the conduct "would reasonably have to be undertaken in relation
to an existing campaign." 162 Yet nine years later, the Counsel recommended revocation of a private foundation's Section 501(c)(3) exemption on
the ground that the group had urged its members to run for political party
precinct committee seats. 163 The absence of evidence that any member of
the group had actually responded to the urging was brushed aside. "[A]
specific, identifiable candidate is not required" for a violation of the prohibition, the Counsel declared, without reference to the prior opinion." 6
Does an organization's intent bear on whether its activity breaches the
prohibition? Yes, ruled the Service in 1972: A university may, without
peril to its exemption, offer a course that requires students to work in political campaigns as long as its purpose is to develop students' knowledge and
skills.1 65 No, asserted the Counsel in 1979: "An organization can violate
the proscription even if it acts for reasons other than intervening in a polit166
ical campaign."
The Service appears to espouse, in some instances, an "effectiveness of
the activity" test, under which some involvement in arguably political activities is permissible when the organization's message reaches only a few peo160. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248,
1978-2 C.B. 154; Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36002 (Sept. 8, 1989); Gen. Couns. Mem. 29,414 (Feb. 29,
1984).
161. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

162. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,557 (Jan. 19, 1976).
163. Gen. Coun. Mem. 39,811 (June 30, 1989). The organization's exemption was on the line
for several different violations of § 501(c)(3). Nonetheless, the question that the Counsel briefed,
and answered in the affirmative, was whether urging members to run for local party offices constituted an independent ground of revocation. Id.
164. Id.
165.

Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246.

166. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979), revoked on other grounds by Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Nov. 7, 1985) ("All interven-

tions are prohibited regardless of motive.").
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ple167 or, if it reaches many, they constitute an audience unlikely to be
swayed by the message. 168 Nonetheless, the Counsel has also specifically
and not the effect, constitute[s] intervention in a
stated that "[t]he effort,
169
campaign."
political
The Service's rulings and positions in the area of voter education illustrate with particular force the lack of stability in the interpretation of the
electoral prohibition and the difficulty of predicting with any certainty
where the agency will draw its lines. In May 1978, the Service ruled that a
charity publishing in its newsletter, without editorial comment, the responses of candidates to questions about issues of concern to the group
could not qualify for exemption under Section 501(c)(3).1 70 The electioneering prohibition, the Ruling said, "do[es] not refer only to participation or
intervention with a partisan motive, but to any participation or intervention
which affects voter acceptance or rejection of a candidate."1 71 Amid a
storm of protest from charitable organizations, the Service revoked the Ruling a month later and substituted another which conceded that "[c]ertain
'voter education' activities... may not constitute prohibited political activity."' 172 The substituted Ruling, which remains in effect, is marginally, if at
all, more liberal than its predecessor. With almost no analysis or rationale,
and without definition of key terms, the Ruling gives two examples of approved conduct and two examples of conduct that will cost an organization
its charitable exemption. 173
In the first approved fact pattern, the hypothetical group annually disseminates to the public the voting records of all members of Congress on a
wide range of legislative issues and does not imply approval or disapproval
of any member. In the second, the group publishes statements of all candi167. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (Charity's summary of voting records of members of
Congress that indicates whether or not each member voted in accordance with the charity's positions is permissible in part because "[t]he publication will be distributed to the organization's
normal readership who number only a few thousand nation-wide."); Ruling issued to Independent
Sector, Sept. 4, 1980 (stating that charity's newsletter reports of congressional votes on issues of
importance to the charity is permissible in part because the newsletter is not widely distributed
among the electorate) (described in HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 333).
168. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36002 (Sept. 8, 1989) (advising that charity's radio and TV ads
endorsing positions of "clearly perceived" presidential candidate and timed to coincide with presidential debates were not campaign intervention, apparently in part because ads ran mostly in
media markets overwhelmingly in favor of the other candidates). Bruce Hopkins has called this
position "inconsistent and mystifying" and asks, "How can organizations know what the rules are
in the face of policymaking such as this?" HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 349.
169. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,811 (June 30, 1989).
170. Rev. Rul. 78-160, 1978-1 C.B. 153, revoked by Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
171. Id.
172. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
173. Id.
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dates for a given office, prepared in response to the group's questions about
a wide variety of issues of importance to the electorate as a whole; the pres174
entation evinces no bias or preference.
The first instance of disapproved conduct involves a group publishing
candidates' responses to questions phrased in a biased manner and then
distributing the statements widely during an election period. The second
involves a factual and informative compilation of incumbents' voting
records, distributed widely to the electorate during a campaign and
presented without editorial bias but confined to a narrow range of issues of
interest to the group; because of the narrow range of issues and broad distribution, the Ruling states, this hypothetical group would lose its charitable
exemption. 175
The issuance of the substituted Ruling did not end the controversy.
Less than a year later, the Office for Church in Society (OCS), an arm of the
United Church of Christ, asked the Treasury for a ruling on its practice of
annually reporting in its newsletter the voting records of members of Congress; only votes on selected issues of interest to the Church were reported,
and the reports were accompanied by "+"

and "-"

signs to indicate

whether the legislators had voted for or against the Church's position on
each issue. 176 A General Counsel Memorandum analyzing the activity concluded that the reports unequivocally violated the campaign prohibition
and constituted "an inherently political activity," at least when issued in
election years. 177 Noting that OCS had threatened to file suit on constitutional grounds in the event of an adverse ruling, the Counsel outlined a
defense to a8 First Amendment challenge to the prohibition and its
7
application.1
Some months later, after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue "informally requested" a reconsideration, the General Counsel took another
look.17 9 In a second memorandum, which revoked the first without distinguishing it, the Counsel concluded that in the context of "all the facts and
circumstances" of OCS's publication, the prohibition was not violated after
all.'8 ° Shortly after this Memorandum was written but before the Service

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 333-34.

177. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979), revoked by Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July
15, 1980).
178. Id.
179. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
180. Id.
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acted on it, OCS filed suit in a federal district court. 181 Nine days later,
OCS received its favorable ruling and withdrew the suit.18 2 Subsequently,
the Service issued a Revenue Ruling that embodied the OCS ruling and that
it labeled an "amplification" of the 1978 substituted voter education
1 83
ruling.
The new ruling essentially permits reporting on selected votes of individual legislators in a manner that clearly expresses the charity's approval
or disapproval, but it hedges the allowance with the precise facts of OCS's
activity: the voting records of all incumbents are reported, candidates for
re-election are not identified as such, no comment is made on individual
legislators' fitness for office, no comparison is made between incumbent and
other candidates, the organization "point[s] out the inherent limitations of
judging the qualifications of an incumbent on the basis of certain selected
votes," the distribution of the reports is limited to a few thousand people
nationally, and no attempt is made to target the reports to areas where
elections are occurring or to time them to election periods. 8 4
The Ruling on the one hand undercuts the Service's position that any
activity by a charity that has the design or effect of influencing in any way
the choices of voters is prohibited by Section 501(c)(3); clearly, some
amount of such activity is now permitted under some circumstances. On
the other hand, because it gives no indication of which combination of the
many qualifying facts is dispositive, the Ruling leaves charities wishing to
report on legislative voting records in a less than wholly neutral manner to
guess whether the "facts and circumstances" of their own cases will protect
them or bring the potentially fatal blow of revocation.' 85 Moreover, the
appearance of a results-oriented rationale in the OCS case is exacerbated
181. Office for Church in Society v. Commissioner, No. 80-2403 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 22,
1980).
182. HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 334.

183. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
184. Ia It remains a mystery why the Service did not simply invoke the de minimis rule to
permit OCS's legislative report cards, which on the facts given in the General Counsel Memoranda appeared to constitute only a small part of the organization's overall activities. The rule

had not been abandoned by the General Counsel, for it was mentioned in dictum in a later Memorandum, see Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Nov. 7, 1985), and explained to Congress by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1987, see supra note 156. One might speculate that the Service is
more apt to employ the doctrine to excuse past activities than to approve prospective ones.

185. The Service adopted a similar stance to preserve its open-ended discretion in a Revenue
Ruling that permitted a charitable organization to present candidate forums or debates. Rev. Rul.
86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 74. After listing an extensive series of surrounding facts, the Ruling stated that
the Service's conclusion that the forum in question survived scrutiny was "based on the totality of
the circumstances described. The presence or absence of a particular fact here in other similar

situations is not determinative of other cases but would have to be considered in light of all the
surrounding factors in that case." Id.
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when the IRS General Counsel's office takes the position, as it subsequently
has, that the Ruling does not operate to permit "any express or implied
endorsements" of candidates. 8 6 It seems disingenuous to suggest that "+"
signs appearing annually in reports on the votes of House members who run
for office every two years are not an implied endorsement or that "-" signs
under the same circumstances do not convey disapproval of incumbents'
candidacies.
The "facts and circumstances" standard for determining whether prohibited electoral activity has taken place was recently given a new and even
more obscure twist when an Internal Revenue official announced at a meeting of tax attorneys that while the Service intended to get tough on charities' partisan political speech and conduct during the 1992 campaign
season, the exemptions of violators would not be revoked "without considering the overall impact [of the revocation] on tax administration, and on
the community."' 8 7 What this double-edged pronouncement was meant to
signal to charitable organizations, both on its own legal or policy terms and
in light of prior statements and actions by the Treasury, the Courts, and the
Congress, is far from clear.
The Service's failure either to enforce Section 501(c)(3)'s campaign intervention proscription against the vast bulk of the widely publicized Protestant and Catholic church activities described in Section II above, or to
explain why such enforcement was unwarranted, multiplies the questions
about the scope of the provision and about the agency's use of its enforcement discretion. Were the churches investigated and the media reports
found to be exaggerated or wholly untrue? Or were the reports accurate
but the electoral speech and conduct found to be de minimis? Or was the
activity found to be permissible based on all the facts and circumstances?
In fact, it seems most likely that the Treasury's quiescence reflects a recognition that the extraordinary complex interaction of religion and politics in
American life is simply not susceptible to regulation through the black-andwhite, all-or-nothing formulation of the tax code's prohibition or the patchwork of rules and positions by which the Service has tried, and failed, to
develop a comprehensive framework for enforcement. But even if that is
the case, new questions arise. Are churches always to be judged differently
with respect to campaign intervention from other charities? Would revoca186. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39441 (Nov. 7, 1985).
187. Statement of the Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division, quoted in IRS
Official Warns, supra note 45. The context for the remark was a discussion of the Service's chastisement of a well-known evangelical ministry that had endorsed a presidential candidate, and its
imposition of punishment that stopped well short of revocation of exempt status or even an excise
tax penalty. See id.; supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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tion of their exemptions have an impact on "tax administration" and "the
community" 18' 8 that revocation of the exemptions of secular organizations
would not? Are such distinctions constitutionally justifiable? If not, may
other charities then engage in the same types of campaign activity with

impunity?
Absent a judicial command, the Internal Revenue Service is, of course,
under no legal obligation to enforce a Code provision in any given case or to
explain its enforcement decisions.18 9 The Service's failure to act against alleged violations of the Section 501(c)(3) prohibition in individual cases,
even highly publicized ones, does not, moreover, generally give a charity
against which the prohibition is later enforced grounds to escape punishment for engaging in proscribed conduct, because a group alleging discriminatory enforcement must carry an extremely heavy burden of proof. 90
Nonetheless, the lack of answers to questions such as these, taken together
with the vagueness and inconsistency of the Service's rulings and internal
positions on the scope of the campaign activity prohibition, has policy and
constitutional implications that are not adequately addressed by reference
to the broad enforcement discretion of the Treasury or the limits of the
91
selective enforcement doctrine.1
188. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
189. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471,488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd on other groundssub nom In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
190. See Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied,486 U.S. 1015 (1988); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229-30 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied,466 U.S. 971 (1984); Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d
849, 853, 857-58 (10th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1974). The party alleging selective
prosecution or discriminatory enforcement must, under the standards laid down in these cases,
prove first that others similarly situated generally are not sanctioned for the same conduct, and
second that the government decision to sanction the party was based on an invidious consideration such as race or religion. Id. In each of these cases, the party was contesting revocation of
exempt status, and in none was it found to have carried its burden of proof. Id. In two of the
cases, the courts reached this decision despite evidence in the record that the IRS had violated its
own procedures in pursuing the enforcement effort, see ChristianEchoes, 470 F.2d at 853, 858, or
had displayed "religious animus" toward the party, see Church of Scientology, 823 F.2d at 132021.
191. One policy concern is that the absence of clear standards combined with broad enforcement discretion could set the stage for politically motivated enforcement of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
The Internal Revenue Service has been found in the past to have submitted to pressure to act
against charitable organizations holding views offensive to the administration in power. See, e.g.,
Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 867-71 (D.D.C. 1973) (describing intervention by the Nixon white House in IRS determinations of tax-exempt status of plaintiff
and other "left wing" charitable organizations).
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Enforcement by "Competitive Advocates"

As noted earlier, a coalition of pro-choice groups and individuals sought
through a third-party lawsuit to fill the vacuum left by the Internal Revenue Service's unexplained decision not to revoke the tax exemption of the
Roman Catholic Church for its alleged campaign interventions. 192 In the
suit, the organizational plaintiffs, who were themselves exempt from taxes
under Sections 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4), claimed that the Treasury's failure to
move against the Church harmed them by, among other things, placing
them at a competitive disadvantage against a political adversary.1 3 According to the Second Circuit panel that eventually dismissed the suit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs argued:
[t]hat their chance of electoral success is diminished because they do
not receive the advantage that the Church receives from the government's asserted non-enforcement of the Code: The ability to campaign without losing tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3), and the
ability nonetheless to offer their contributors a tax deduction for donating .... The essence of this charge is that the IRS' non-enforcement of the Code creates an uneven playing field, tilted to favor the
Catholic Church. 194
Acknowledging that under some circumstances political competitors
might validly assert that government action or inaction has caused them a
cognizable injury by distorting the political process, 99 the court declined to

192. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 544 F. Supp. at 475-76. The original action was filed

against both the Treasury and two national organizations of the Catholic Church. Id. at 473. The
district judge dismissed the Church as a defendant early in the proceedings, and the suit went
forward against the government alone. Id. at 487.
193. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990).
194. Id. at 1029.
195. Id. at 1031. The standing of third-party political competitors has been recognized in

other cases as well. See, e.g., Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 62627 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992) (Minor party presidential candidate had
standing to challenge tax-exempt status of charitable organization sponsoring presidential primary
debates that excluded her when candidate alleged exclusion put her at political disadvantage rela-

tive to major party presidential candidates.); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Federal Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1098 (D.C. Cir.) (union members had
standing to challenge federal election laws permitting solicitation of campaign contributions by

corporations from certain corporate employees where union members claimed "a relative diminution of their political voices . . . as a direct result" of the laws), aff'd, 459 U.S. 983 (1982);
Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 1980) (Citizens group had standing to
challenge congressional franking statute on behalf of group members who worked in and contrib-

uted to congressional campaigns of nonincumbents because statute undercut political effectiveness
of such members' work and contributions.), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
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recognize such "competitive advocate" standing in the case before it.1 96
These plaintiffs were not true competitors of the Church in the abortion
debate, the court stated, "since by their own admission they [chose] not to
'
match the Church's alleged electioneering with their own." 197
This "selfimposed restraint," together with plaintiffs' concession that the Treasury
had correctly assessed their own tax status, meant that the plaintiffs had not
suffered the particularized injury in fact necessary to fulfill Article III
198
standing requirements.
The Second Circuit majority's holding was met by a strong dissent rejecting the notion that the Section 501(c)(3) plaintiffs should have to break
the law by engaging in campaign activities in order to earn recognition as
true competitive advocates.1 99 The plaintiffs were "indisputably" political
competitors of the Church, wrote the dissenting judge, in a wide variety of
arenas "beyond the formal processes of electoral politics."'2 "° If the allegations of the Church's campaign activity were correct,
[a]nd plaintiffs seek only the opportunity to prove them, the plaintiff
organizations are seriously injured both in the eyes of the law and in
the real world of political advocacy by the significant advantage currently enjoyed by the Catholic Church as a result of governmental
action ... [in] tolerating a law violation that enables one side to
promote its cause with a significant technique denied to the other
side.20 1
This attack on the majority's reasoning, which has been echoed by at
least one commentator," 2 may open the door for third-party challenges to
the IRS's nonenforcement of the campaign prohibition in other jurisdictions. While such suits could have the healthy effect of "levelling the playing field" of political debate in some cases, they also could become
instruments for harassment of political and religious rivals. 20 3 The latter

196. United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031. Nor did the court recognize the
various plaintiffs' other theories of standing based on their status as clergy, taxpayers, or voters.
Id. at 1024-28.
197. Id. at 1029.
198. Id. at 1030-31.
199. Ia.at 1033 (Newman, J.,dissenting).
200. Id. at 1032 (Newman, J.,dissenting).
201. Id at 1032-33 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
202. Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status: The Second Circuit's Competitive PoliticalAdvocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 733-36 (1990).
203. In the course of the litigation begun in Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Regan, supra
notes 185-93 and accompanying text, the government, in seeking dismissal, argued to the Supreme
Court that the case "threatens irreparable harm to the interests of both the government and the
church." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, Baker v. Abortion RightsMobilization, No. 86157 (1986), and that the "burdensome" discovery imposed by the lower court would "intrude
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potential exists because plaintiffs, in pressing their suits, could draw on the
most extreme and restrictive statements and rulings of the courts and the
Service - for example, that the campaign prohibition is absolute, that it
extends to comment on sitting public officials as well as candidates, that
arguably political speech which makes no reference to a specific, identifiable
candidate may breach the statute, that the intent behind the speech or conduct is irrelevant if it might be interpreted to influence voters, and that a
single, neutral, accurate legislative report card is fatal if its scope is confined
to issues of interest to the group making the report and the report is distributed beyond the group's own membership. In short, the stage has been set
to permit institution of third-party suits on the most trivial grounds with
virtually no risk to the plaintiffs that their positions will be found frivolous.
III.

A

CRITIQUE OF THE CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY PROHIBITION AND A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE

A.

The Illusory and Genuine Government Interests Implicated by the
Campaign Activity Prohibition

One is hard pressed to find in the legislative history, court decisions, and
IRS pronouncements pertaining to the Section 501(c)(3) prohibition a cogent rationale for the bar.2" Certainly the origins of the provision offer no
suggestion of a government interest to be served: It was proposed in a fit of
pique by a United States Senator and adopted by Congress without substantive debate, hearings, or committee comment.2 "5 Most subsequent attempts
by authorities to defend or explain the restriction, when made at all, are less
than convincing.
Perhaps the least plausible justification was that propounded by the
Christian Echoes court in response to the plaintiff's claim that the prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. 20 6 The provision, asserted the court,
serves the "overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest ... [in]
guarantying [sic] that the wall separating church and state remain high and
deeply into the internal procedures of the agency charged with administering the tax law and the

internal activities of one of the Nation's major religious groups ....

Id. at 10. This would,

stated the government, "inevitably produce serious challenges to the confidentiality of information
provided to federal tax authorities ... and threatens to inteject the Judiciary into an arena re-

served for the Executive Branch." Id.
204. See Chisolm, supra note 9, at 337-52; Elias Clark, The Limitation on PoliticalActivities:
A DiscordantNote in the Law of Charities,46 VA. L. REV. 439, 452 (1960); West, supra note 6, at

403.
205. See HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 327 and citations therein.
206. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
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firm." 20' 7 Even if one were to concede that the campaign proscription, as

applied to churches, might be an effective and constitutional means of promoting church-state separation, 0 8 such a rationale hardly vindicates its application to the hundreds of thousands of nonreligious organizations also
embraced by Section 501(c)(3). Hence, this theory fails to justify a complete ban on political activity by charitable entities.

The most commonly cited warrant for the provision is that forbidding
charities to participate in the electoral process advances the political neutrality of the Treasury Department.20 9 This "Treasury neutrality" rationale

can be traced to an influential 1930 Second Circuit decision, Slee v. Cornmissioner,"' in which the court held that an organization active in lobbying

against birth control laws was not "exclusively" charitable.211 Judge
Learned Hand declared in Slee: "Political agitation as such is outside the
[charitable exemption] statute .... Controversies of that sort must be con'212
ducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside from them.
Whatever legitimacy this theory may once have had, the tax-exempt status
of Section 501(c)(3) organizations, standing alone, can no longer rationally
justify the suppression of their campaign speech and activity on grounds of
Treasury neutrality. At present, numerous organizations exempt from the
payment of federal income tax under subsections of Section 501 other than

Section 501(c)(3) may engage in unlimited amounts of campaign activity
without jeopardy to their tax status. 21 3 Congress's choice to exempt from

taxation virtually all the income of organizations created specifically to raise
207. Id. at 857.
208. Some commentators have strongly questioned whether in fact the prohibition can survive scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. See Caron & Dessingue, supra note 58, at 181-93;
Slye,supra note 7, at 291; Joel E. Davidson, Note, Religion in Politicsandthe Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 397, 416 (1973). But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (in upholding Oregon's prohibition of all, including religious, use of peyote, the Court
radically reorganized free exercise analysis).
209. See, eg., Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989); Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 854, 857; H.R. REP. No. 391(11),
supra note 62, at 1625; Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,137 (Oct. 22, 1979), revoked on other grounds by
Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,444 (July 15, 1980).
210. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930); see Clark, supra note 204, at 446-47.
211. Slee, 42 F.2d at 185.
212. Id. While Slee concerned lobbying by a charity rather than campaign speech or conduct, Congress, the courts, and the IRS have treated the Treasury neutrality rationale as applying
equally to both forms of activity. See Judy Ann Rosenblum, Note, Religion and PoliticalCampaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 536, 547-48 (1981); supra note 209.
213. E.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (exempting labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations),
501(c)(6) (exempting business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade,
and professional football leagues).
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money for and carry out election campaigns2 14 further underscores the in-

congruity of conditioning the charitable exemption on complete silence as
to any matter than may be construed to fall into the electoral arena.

Still another justification that has been offered for the proscription is
that political activity is fundamentally inconsistent with "charitable" status. 2 15 Certainly government may have an interest in ensuring that groups
accorded such status under the tax laws conform to the basic requirements
of the American common law of charitable trusts.2 16 This interest is not
served by the provision at issue, however, because American charitable
trust law in fact generally does not forbid political activity pursued for charitable, rather than purely political, ends.2 17 Indeed, Section 501(c)(3)'s
campaign prohibition, together with its limitation on lobbying, 2 18 constitutes an aberration even in the federal tax law, which otherwise recognizes
that the key to whether a group is "exclusively" charitable under the Internal Revenue Code2 19 lies in its purposes, not the means by which it accom-

plishes those purposes. 220 Numerous organizational activities that might

seem at odds with popular notions of "charity" have been deemed to come
safely under the charitable umbrella when they are aimed at accomplishing
221
a charitable purpose, including some lobbying for changes in the laws,
214. I.R.C. § 527; supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
215. E.g., Association of the Bar v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1988) (political
activity falls outside the charitable purposes enumerated in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1030 (1989); see also Chisolm, supra note 9, at 345 (Congress may have intended the electoral
activity prohibition to reflect a sense that political activity is inherently uncharitable.).
216. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court ruled that no organization is entitled to tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) unless it is "charitable" within the meaning
of charitable trust law. Id. at 586-92.
217. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmts. j & k (1959); 4A AUSTIN W.
ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 374.6, at 224 (4th ed. 1989);
TREUSCH, supra note 60, at 263-64; Chisolm, supra note 9, at 345-46; Tommy F. Thompson, The
Availability of the Federal Educational Tax Exemption for Propaganda Organizations, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 487, 513 n.56 (1985). Trusts devoted to the support of a single political party fall
outside this general tolerance, however. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra, § 374 cmt.
k; 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra, § 374.6, at 221.
218. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) forbids charitable organizations to engage in "substantial" efforts to
influence legislation. See supra note 52.
219. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
220. E.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (purposes of
charitable organization not altered by its commercial activity); Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 202, 214 (1978) (sale of handicrafts of impoverished artisans not a "purpose" but
"merely an activity" that furthers entity's exempt purposes); I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (qualified organizations must be "organized and operated exclusively for" enumerated purposes); Rev. Rul. 74-587,
1974-2 C.B. 162 (organization's purposes, not its activities, are focus of inquiry under exclusivity
requirement); Rev. Rul. 69-572, 1969-2 C.B. 119 (same).
221. The charitable exemption statute provides that "no substantial part of the activities" of a
charity may consist of attempts to influence legislation. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added).
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instituting litigation aimed at altering the laws,2 22 conducting consumer
boycotts of businesses,22 3 and engaging in corporate proxy contests.22 4
Neither Congress nor the courts nor the IRS has ever explained, in the
context of the Section 501(c)(3) proscription, why campaign-related speech
or conduct so differs from these other attempts to influence the political,
social, economic, or moral status quo that an organization engaging in it
' 225
cannot properly be called "charitable."
Assuming, nonetheless, that some distinction worth preserving in a democracy may exist between election-related advocacy and other forms of
organizational intervention in the shaping of public policy, 2 2 6 there remains
only one characteristic of charities on which a limitation of political speech
may rationally be based: their ability to receive funds tax deductible to
donors as charitable contributions.22 7 Though the authorities have consistently failed to articulate this difference when expounding on the Section
501(c)(3) campaign prohibition, the double tax benefit does set churches
and other charities apart from nearly all other kinds of tax-exempt organizations.2 28 When it is brought directly to bear in the electoral arena, a gen-

222. Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175.
223. HOPKINs, supra note 5, at 340-41 (discussing favorable ruling issued by IRS to organization conducting national boycott against infant formula manufacturer).
224. Center on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 874 n.21 (D.D.C.
1973).
225. Professor Chisolm posits that the restriction is founded on congressional "overreaction
to isolated incidents and periodic personal affront to individual legislators rather than response to
either careful empirical data or sound theoretical underpinnings." Chisolm, supra note 9, at 337
n.130.
226. The Supreme Court has held that, unlike other forms of political speech, electoral advocacy in the form of financial support to candidates may properly be regulated in order to serve the
compelling government interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480,496-97 (1985); Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976) (per curiam). This rationale for regulation does not, of course, support a total bar to campaign-related speech by churches
and other charitable organizations, but it does suggest that some aspects of electoral speech present issues of concern that other forms of political advocacy do not. See Chisolm, supra note 9, at
361-62.
227. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). Among all the kinds of groups exempt from income tax under
§ 501(c)(3), only those organized and operated for "testing for public safety" are not eligible to
receive deductible charitable contributions under § 170(c)(2).
228. Veterans' organizations, which are exempt from federal income taxation under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(19), and nonprofit cemetery companies, exempt under § 501(c)(13), are also eligible to
receive deductible charitable contributions under § 170(c)(3), (c)(5). Fraternal societies, exempt
under § 501(c)(10), may receive charitable contributions under § 170(c)(4), but only to the extent
that such gifts are applied by the organization to exclusively charitable purposes. None of these
types of entities is subject to a proscription on electioneering. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(10), (c)(13),
(c)(19).
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uine public interest in the political neutrality of government is
implicated.2 2 9
At a time when, for all practical purposes, a political party, campaign
fundraising organization, or political action committee need not pay federal
income tax, 230 no tax-exempt entity enjoys an inherent advantage when it
participates in the electoral process. But there can be little doubt that in the
expensive competition for voters' attention that attends most elections,
groups which press their viewpoints with funds that donors themselves may
write off their taxes possess in effect a publicly funded edge over their rivals.
That is a situation which Congress may sensibly and constitutionally seek
to remedy, not by silencing churches and other charitable organizations as
such but rather through a narrow restriction that forbids only their use of
deductible funds to intervene in political campaigns.
B.

ConstitutionalProblems Inherent in the Current Campaign
Activity Prohibition
1. The Absence of Alternative Means for Political Expression as an
Unconstitutional Condition on Receipt of Tax Benefits
Because the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations, by itself, provides no unique government-funded advantage to charities in the electoral
arena, the Section 501(c)(3) electioneering prohibition (tied as it is to charities' exemptions rather than to their use of deductible contributions) may be
vulnerable to a First Amendment attack under the Supreme Court's decisions in Rust v. Sullivan 2 1 and Federal Communications Commission v.
League of Women Voters.2 32
In Rust, the Court upheld regulations prohibiting federally funded family planning programs from counselling patients about abortion.23 3 Asserting that Congress may constitutionally choose to subsidize expression of
some viewpoints while withholding subsidy from others, the Court observed
that the restraint at issue survived scrutiny under "unconstitutional conditions" precedents because it affected the federal grantees only when they
were acting within the immediate bounds of the project receiving the federal
229. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990); cf. Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp.

26, 30, 31 (D.D.C. 1980) (where federal statute permitted use of franking privileges by incumbent
members of Congress for political purposes, nonincumbent congressional candidates suffered substantial injury from operation of the statute), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
230.
231.
232.
233.

I.R.C. § 527; supra notes 82-83, 87 and accompanying text.
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764.
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benefit.23 4 The exercise of a constitutional right is not denied when Congress conditions a public benefit on forfeit of the right, the Court said, as
long as the condition stops short of prohibiting the exercise of the disfavored right by alternative means.2 35

In League of Women Voters, the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a law that barred federal grants to public radio and television
stations that engaged in any expression of editorial opinion, even when the
editorializing was supported wholly by nonfederal funds.2 36 The outcome
would have been different, noted the Court, if the stations had been permitted by Congress to create affiliate organizations, funded solely by nonfederal
2 37
sources, to carry out their editorializing activity.

234. "The regulations govern the scope of the... project's activities, and leave the grantee
unfettered in its other activities. The ...

grantee can continue to ...

provide abortion-related

services, and engage in abortion advocacy... through programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives [the federal] funds." Id. at 1774 (citation omitted).
235. Id at 1774-75. The Supreme Court has in other settings distinguished government's
right to subsidize certain forms of expression or conduct while denying subsidy to others from
unconstitutional government conditions that, in effect, penalize the disfavored speech in a way
that goes beyond denying the speaker the subsidy for his or her expression. In Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), for example, the Court turned back a First Amendment challenge to tax regulations disallowing a business deduction for expenses incurred by taxpayers in
lobbying for or against laws affecting their businesses. Id. at 512-13. The court distinguished
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which had struck down as unconstitutional a California
requirement that veterans wishing to take advantage of a special property tax exemption sign
loyalty oaths. The Cammarano Court noted that the law under consideration in Speiser denied
the balking veterans a benefit because they engaged in constitutionally protected speech, while the
tax law at issue in Cammarano merely required business taxpayers "to pay for [their lobbying]
entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do."
Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513; see also Rust, I11 S. Ct. at 1774 ("[O]ur 'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in which the government has placed a condition on the recipient of
the subsidy, rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program");
Board of Trustees v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 476 (D.D.C. 1991) ("The Supreme Court's discussion in Rust ... specifically reaffirmed the unconstitutionally of speech-related restrictions
applicable to recipients of government funds as such.") (emphasis added); cf Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980) (While government need not pay for abortion for a Medicaid recipient, "[a] substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had attempted to withhold all
Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion.").
236. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-402
(1984).
237. Id. at 400-01; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 &
n.6 (1983) (holding that statutory restriction on substantial lobbying by charitable organizations
does not violate organizations' free speech rights where organizations are free to create financially
separate § 501(c)(4) affiliates to engage in such lobbying on their behalf with nondeductible
funds).
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Because the federal tax statutes and regulations currently forbid charities to create segregated funds or separate affiliates solely for the purpose of
expressing their political views outside the bounds of the organization supported by deductible contributions,23 8 the effect is to muzzle charities' political speech completely, even that speech which a charity is willing to engage
in without support from the only relevant federal benefit it receives - deductible contributions. As demonstrated, the government has shown no
compelling, or even substantial, interest that would justify this interference.23 9 Hence the restriction as currently formulated in the tax code and
regulations appears to place an unconstitutional condition on charitable
groups' expression, a defect that can be remedied only by opening up an
alternative channel through which churches and other charities could engage in electoral speech and conduct with the aid solely of contributions not
deductible to their donors. 24° A proposal for structuring such an alternative channel, and for defining and regulating its use, is set out in Section III,
subsection C, below.
2.

The Constitutional Defect of Vagueness in the Current Campaign
Activity Prohibition

A conclusion that Congress may legitimately employ the tax laws to
curb a charity's electoral speech and conduct only so far as to require the
group to express its views through an affiliate without access to the deductible income of the mother organization does not, standing alone, heal the
constitutional defects of the current prohibition. Without clarification of
the restriction, churches and other charitable organizations would continue
to lack adequate notice to comply with even a more narrowly applicable
limitation on their electoral activities. The confusion about what kinds of
expression violate the current restriction would simply translate into confusion about what kinds of expressions may still safely be engaged in by the
mother organization and what kinds must be relegated to the affiliate.
Hence, critical constitutional and policy issues remain unresolved as long as
the regulations sweep in "indirect" as well as "direct" political participa238. See supra notes 88-94, 112-14 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 204-25 and accompanying text.
240. Professor Chisolm believes that the charitable exemption does provide an independent
basis for restriction of charities' political speech and activity. Chisolm, supra note 9, at 352, 362.
She argues, however, that the current formulation of the § 501(c)(3) prohibition may be an unconstitutional condition on charities' receipt of the federal benefits of exemption and eligibility for
deductible contributions because the statute and regulations allow charities no alternative means
for political expression and the government purposes underlying the tax benefits charities receive
could be served by a narrower restriction. Id. at 319-52.
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tion, and as long as the Treasury resists defining those terms, continues to
rely on the "facts and circumstances" shibboleth rather than on specific
guidelines, contradicts its own reasoning from one determination to the
next, and declines to explain its enforcement decisions.
The fundamental problems involved in drawing lines in the regulation of
expression have been considered by courts. In Buckley v. Valeo, 24 1 for example, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of several provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, including one that placed a
dollar ceiling on the annual expenditures most individuals and entities were
permitted to make "'relative to a clearly identified candidate... advocating the election or defeat of such candidate.' "242 On its way to striking
down the provision as an impermissible burden on free speech rights, the
Court observed that:
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in
practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of
but campaigns themselves
their positions on various public2 issues,
43
generate issues of public interest.
That same concern with the difficulties inherent in vague legislative distinctions between prohibited and permitted speech emerged in an earlier
case, Thomas v. Collins.2 44 Thomas invalidated a state statute governing
"solicitation" by union organizers: "[T]he supposedly clear-cut distinction
between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and solicitation puts the
speaker... wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hear... [but
ers ....
Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion
245
rather] blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said.
The compliance and enforcement dilemmas posed by ill-defined restrictions on expression are compounded when the expression involved is moti241. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
242. Id. at 41-42.
243. Id. at 42. The Court saved the provision against a challenge on grounds of vagueness by

construing it to regulate only "communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election
or defeat of a candidate." Id. at 43. However, the Court determined that, even narrowly construed, the provision as written did not serve a government interest compelling enough to justify
the burden it imposed on First Amendment rights. Id. at 44-5 1.
244. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
245. Id. at 535; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 535); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (Vague
regulation of expression "trap[s] the innocent by not providing fair warning," fosters "arbitrary
and discriminatory application," and inhibits protected speech.).
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vated by sincere religious belief. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals,
in turning back a challenge by local tax authorities to the charitable status
of the Unification Church, rejected the contention that the executive branch
of government could as a general matter declare "political" expression or
conduct by churches to be outside the properly "religious" sphere.2' Taking note of the "substantial arguments .. . that traditional theology has
always mandated religious action in social, political and economic matters"
and that "virtually all of the recognized religions and denominations in
America today address political and economic issues within their basic theology,"24 7 the court stated:
[I]t is not the province of the civil authorities to indulge in... distillation as to what is to be denominated religious and what political or
economic. It is for religious bodies themselves, rather than the
courts or administrative agencies, to define, by their teaching and
activities, what their religion is. The courts are obliged to accept
such characterization of the activities of such bodies, including that
of the Church in the case before us, unless it is found to be insincere
or sham.248
In 1946, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a similar view
when it upheld the charitable status of the Methodist Episcopal Church's
Board of Temperance in the context of an IRS determination that the

Board's attempts to promote temperance legislation barred it from religious
classification under the tax laws.2 49 "A bright line between that which
brings conviction to one person and its influence on the body politic cannot
250
be drawn," the court asserted.
Religion includes a way of life as well as beliefs upon the nature of
the world and the admonitions to be "Doers of the word and not
hearers only" (James 1:22) and "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations ....
" (Matthew 28:19) are as old as the Christian Church.
The step from acceptance by the believer to his seeking to influence

others in the same direction is a perfectly natural one, and it is found
in countless religious groups.2 51

246. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d
662, 668 (N.Y. 1982).
247. Id. at 668 n.6; see also West, supra note 6, at 396 ("Many, if not most, churches and
religious groups reject the idea that religion is limited to the private realm ....[T]hey consider
their efforts to influence the making of public policy to be an integral part of their religious enterprise .... [P]olitical activity may even be a form of worship.").

248.
249.
250.
251.

Holy Spirit Ass'n, 435 N.E.2d at 668.
Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1941).
Id. at 110.
Id. (omission in original).
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These rulings suggest that even if the Section 501(c)(3) prohibition were
to be limited to campaign intervention or participation supported by deductible contributions, the ambiguous and wavering contours of the provision would continue to make honest compliance and fair enforcement
virtually impossible as a practical matter, and continue to call the provision's constitutionality into serious question. Moreover, the rulings demonstrate that merely narrowing the application of the prohibition, while
retaining the vague language of the current statute, regulations, and Treasury rulings, would not resolve the intricate definitional and enforcement
problems posed by religiously inspired political expression.
C. A ProposedAlternative Limitation on ElectoralSpeech and Conduct
by Churches and Other Charitable Organizations
It follows, then, that the legitimate interests of both charitable organizations and the government would be well served by a clear, comprehensible
definition of the kind of expression that government may properly decline
to support through the indirect subsidy of deductible contributions. The
modification of the electoral activity restriction proposed by Laura Brown
Chisolm would achieve this goal. Professor Chisolm suggests that charities
be barred from directly engaging in only that campaign-related activity
which falls within the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)25 2 definitions of those campaign "expenditures" and "contributions" that are subject to disclosure and other regulation under the Act.25 3 For example,
FECA may regulate the expenditures of individuals and entities other than
political parties or committees only when such expenditures relate to
"clearly identified" candidates.2 5 4 "Clearly identified" is defined by the Act
to require that the communication funded by the expenditure in question
make unambiguous reference to a candidate by such means as his or her
name, photograph, or drawing.25 5 On First Amendment grounds, moreover, the Supreme Court has limited the statute's reach to expenditures for
communications that advocate in express terms the election or defeat of
such clearly identified candidates. z 6 Specifically, the Court has defined express advocacy to include only admonitions such as "'vote for,' 'elect,'
252. 2 U.S.C. ch. 14 (1971, as amended).
253. See Chisolm, supra note 9, at 362; see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (1971, as amended) (defining "contribution"), 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (1971, as amended) (defining "expenditure").
254. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 & n.51, 79-80 (1976) (per curiam).
255. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) (1971, as amended); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 n.51 (reference to a candidate by means of his or her initials, nickname, incumbency in a specific office, or
status as a candidate for a particular office is also "unambiguous").
256. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-45.
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'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' ' Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' and 'reject.' "257 Campaign "contributions" that fall within FECA's
regulatory sphere include donations of money, but exclude, for example,
such indirectly conferred benefits as volunteered personal services and the
2 53
donated use of churches or community rooms.
The mechanism for ensuring that such concisely defined electoral
speech is not carried on by charities with their deductible funds substantially exists in Internal Revenue Code section 527(f). As noted earlier, that
section provides that exempt organizations may engage in activities to influence the outcome of elections (including both the raising and spending of
funds) and may avoid taxation of the income thus raised and expended if
they conduct their activities through a separate segregated fund.2 59 It is
proposed that Section 527(f) be amended to provide explicitly that any organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) must create such a fund if it
chooses to engage in political activity within the scope of the FECA definitions above 2 ' and may not use tax-deductible contributions to support the
segregated fund in any way. 61 Penalties for violation of the proposed rule
could be modeled on the existing structure of punitive excise taxes imposed
by Section 4955,262 with the additional proviso that the Treasury may automatically revoke the charitable exemption of any organization on which the
second-tier penalty has already been levied and which continues to flout the
requirements of the amended Section 527(f).
Because, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[d]iscussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates" are entitled to the broadest
257. Id. at 44 & n.52; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (reaffirming that "express advocacy" requires the use of such definite
exhortations).
258. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (1971, as amended).
259. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Current regulations forbid charities to
establish such funds to engage in speech or activity related to the campaigns of candidates for
public office, however. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
260. A requirement that charities wishing to involve themselves in explicit campaign activity
create segregated funds to finance the activity would avoid the conceptual problem involved in
giving them the option to create such funds that § 527(0 now extends to other § 501(c) organizations. Under that section, a noncharitable exempt organization may choose not to make its political expenditures and contributions through a PAC and instead pay a tax on the outlay.
Permitting charities the identical alternative would, theoretically at least, perpetuate the advan-

tage that their access to deductible charitable contributions gives them vis-a-vis noncharitable
exempt entities engaging in the political process.
261. Professor Chisolm rightly proposes that charities, if allowed to create affiliated PACs,
should be barred from using their deductible funds not only for campaign "contributions" and
"expenditures" but also for the costs of administering the PACs or soliciting contributions to

them. See Chisolm, supra note 9, at 362-63.
262. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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protection of the First Amendment,2 63 it is further proposed that the Treasury adopt a presumption against imputation to the charitable organization
of electoral speech or conduct by any person affiliated as officer, other
leader, or member. This presumption, which would help to assure that the
individual rights of affiliated persons are not chilled, would be overcome
only by a clear showing that the person, with the knowledge of the entity,
spoke or acted on the entity's behalf rather than in a personal capacity. 2 4
The advantages of the proposed approach from the government's point
of view are several. First and most important, it preserves the principle that
government should not, by its action or inaction, by either conferring special benefits or imposing special handicaps on specific classes of organizations, "tilt the playing field" of political debate and distort the outcome of
the electoral process.2 65 Second, through the device of the segregated funfd,
the proposed revision squarely places the above-defined electoral activity of
churches and other charities within the regulatory sphere of election laws,
subjecting such activity to all the spending limits and public disclosure requirements that such laws now impose on other entities engaging in the
electoral process. 266 Third, by clearly defining the political activity that
falls outside the scope of the double tax benefit enjoyed by Section 501(c)(3)
organizations and setting out a firm and explicit schedule of penalties for
violations, the suggested arrangement permits straightforward, evenhanded,
predictable enforcement of the statute by the Treasury. In particular, it
relieves the Internal Revenue Service of the confounding task of attempting
to distinguish between currently prohibited "indirect" campaign intervention and protected religious speech on moral issues in the electoral arena.
The government's interests are also protected because the proposed revision does nothing to dilute the other requirements of Section 501(c)(3) and
hence does not imperil the concept of "charity" within the structure of the
federal tax laws. There is no reason why entities that choose to engage in
263. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
264. The current Treasury position, as articulated by the IRS General Counsel, appears to
place the burden on the charitable organization whose officers engage in electoral activities to
challenge the conduct in order to avoid imputation to the entity. See supra note 45. Separate
segregated funds established by § 501(c) entities are already recognized by the Code as distinct
organizations. I.R.C. § 527(f)(c). Hence there should be no issue of imputation to the mother
entity of speech or conduct of affiliated persons that takes place explicitly within the context of
such a fund. Cf Chisolm, supra note 9, at 363 (recommending no limitations on affiliations between charities and PACs other than "formal and fiscal separation").

265. See supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
266. E.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-437 (1971, as amended) (disclosure requirements for entities and
individuals making contributions and expenditures in connection with federal election campaigns), 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1971, as amended) (dollar limitations on contributions and expenditures
in connection with federal election campaigns).
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some direct electoral activity through a segregated fund should not, for example, remain subject to Section 501(c)(3)'s command that exempt charities
be organized and operated "exclusively" for one or more of the statute's
enumerated charitable purposes. This requirement provides a built-in limit
on the scope of an exempt charitable organization's political activities, mandating (on pain of revocation of exempt status) that such activities be confined to campaign participation aimed at promoting the group's legitimate
religious or other charitable purposes and, thus, ensuring that Section
501(c)(3) classification does not deteriorate into a mere guise for wide-ranging political action.2 67
The proposal offers charitable organizations relief from the amorphous
threat to their exemptions posed by the current electoral activity prohibition, an expansion of their ability to speak openly on public issues of concern to them, and firm ground on which to base their choices about how
they will speak and act in matters touching on the political debate. But it
also requires, with respect to express advocacy of election or defeat of
clearly identified candidates, that churches and other charities submit themselves to the same limitations on fundraising and expenditures, and the
same public disclosure requirements, that all other organizations must
obey. For those churches that have in the past engaged in direct political
action, including outright endorsements and financial support of specific
candidates, unfettered by enforcement of either the tax or election laws, the
proposed revision may appear to result in a net loss rather than a net gain in
the scope of their free speech and free exercise rights.
This concern raises the question of whether even the narrow limitation
on the political activities of charitable organizations suggested here invades
too deeply the province of religiously inspired speech. That question must
be answered in the negative. The Supreme Court has made clear its belief
that nothing in the Constitution entitles the exercise of fundamental rights,
even the exercise of rights with the most urgent claims to First Amendment
267. See HOPKINS, supra note 5, at 249-50 (Any substantial noncharitable purpose deprives
an entity of exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).); cf Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) ("[S]hould [a nonprofit advocacy group's] independent
[campaign] expenditures become so extensive that the organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be classified as a political committee.") (citation omitted). Similarly, the requirements that § 501(c)(3) organizations serve public rather than
private interests, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(ii) (as amended in 1990), and that no part of such
an entity's net earnings inure to the benefit of any private individual, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), may be
enforced to prevent the purely political use of charities. See Chisolm, supra note 9, at 342 &

n.152.
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protection, to government support in the form of tax benefits.26 8 Indeed,
the revision of the tax code proposed here derives its justification not from
the notion that American taxpayers ought to support through federal benefits either the political or the religious activities of Section 501(c)(3) organizations but rather from two quite different premises: that there is no
rational basis for Congress to distinguish charitable organizations from all
other exempt entities with respect to political action not supported by deductible contributions, and that both constitutional and public policy considerations strongly dictate that any regulation which restricts speech and
conduct in the political and religious spheres be narrowly drawn and intelligible to both the regulators and the regulated.
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the mid-1980s, when acrimony over the role of religion in politics ran higher than at any other time in recent memory, there were some
who openly doubted whether the Republic could withstand the religious
voice in public affairs. That our democracy survives, intact and arguably
enriched by the ventilation of competing positions and beliefs, vindicates
anew the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 26' 9 The purposes which animate that principle would be served by a change in the tax
laws that welcomes churches and other charitable organizations into the
community of speakers in the electoral arena - on terms that are fair, coherent, protective of the public interest, and scrupulously equal to those
extended to other tax-exempt entities.

268. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773-76 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1982).
269. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

